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SCOTT v. THE KITTANNING COAL COMPANY.
A. contracted to deliver to B. 50,000 tons of a certain coal in a yea- shipments
to be at the rate of 6000 tons monthly, at the option of B., he to give notice by the
25th of each month of his requirements for the succeeding month. Held, that the
contract was clearly severable.
Where there has been part performance of a severable contract, and the thing received has been paid for and consumed, the fact that another article was substituted
for that contracted for, does not give the right to rescind; the appropriate remedy
is by set-off or action for damages.
Evidence of a false statement by the vendor of the cost of the article sold is not
admissible.
The plea of non-assumpsit entitles the defendant to prove anything which shows
that the plaintiff ex aquo et bono ought not to recover. Therefore, in a suit on a
severable contract for damages for non-acceptance of a portion of the article contracted to be taken, under the plea of non assumpsit evidence is admissible that, in
the part performance another a ticle was fraudulently substituted for that contracted
for, and that the defendant thereby suffered injury, not as a set-off, but to show that
the plaintiff has no right to recover.
The same evidence is admissible as tending to show that the plaintiffs were not
ready and willing to deliver.
Compensation is the true criterion for damages in actions for breach of contract,
and is ordinarily attained by taking the difference between the contract price and the
market price at the time the contract ought to have been fulfilled, but this measure
is not always sufficient: the true measure in this case considered.

to the Common Pleas No. 1, of Philadelphia county.
Case, by the Kittanning Coal Company, against J. C. Scott &
Sons, to recover damages for the breach of a written agreement to
take and pay for fifty thousand tons of coal. Plea, payment; to
ERROR

which the defendants on the trial added non assumy8erunt.
On the trial, before BIDDLE, J., the following facts appeared: On
March 24th 1874, the plaintiffs and defendants had entered into a
written agreement by which the plaintiffs agreed to deliver on

board vessels at Greenwich wharves, beginning with March 1874,
and ending with February 1875, fifty thousand tons of its best run
of mine bituminous coal, denominated Exceleior Vein, from collieries in Clearfield county, at $4.60 per 2240 pounds; shipments
to be at the rate of six thousand tons monthly, at the option of J.
C. Scott & Sons; they to give notice on or before the 25th of each
month of the requirements for the succeeding month. The plaintiffs proved the making of the contract, and that only eighteen
thousand thirty-eight and one-half tons of coal had been called for
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by the defendants; further that the notices agreed to be given by
defendants on the 25th of each month had not been given, but that
the amount delivered had been shipped on orders sent from time to
time by defendants. On cross-examination of plaintiffs' witnesses,
it appeared that the plaintiffs, when defendants sent notices as
above mentioned and when vessels arrived at Greenwich ready to
load, had bought coal from a neighboring mine in the same vein
and shipped it to Greenwich ; but they were unable to say positively
whether any of this coal found its way to defendants' vessels or not,
as the cars are entirely in ,the control of the railroad company, and
on arriving at Greenwich are loaded into any vessel which is ready.
In their evidence, defendants offered in various forms to show
that"plaintiffs fraudulently substituted other and inferior coal for
that agreed to be delivered; that the defendants did not know of
this, but finding objections made by their customers, inquired of
plaintiffs, and were assured by them that it was the coal stipulated
for; that they accepted and paid for the coal, believing it to be
what it was represented to be; and that thiis fraudulent substitution involved them in great loss, and prevented them from selling
the balance of that contracted for; to be followed by proof that
plaintiffs waived the notice on the 25th of each month, and accepted
in lieu thereof other notices. Objected to, on the ground that there
was no plea to raise the defence; objection sustained; exception.
They also offered the same evidence as tending to prove the
plaintiffs were not ready and willing to deliver the coal stipulated
for; objection sustained; exception.
The defendants then offered to plead a set-off specially; objected
to, on the ground that defendants cannot plead a set-off after plaintiff has closed his case; objection sustained; exception.
The defendants offered to prove that prior to the making of the
contract sued on, the president of the company stated to defendants
that the cost of producing the coal was $1.18; that this was false,
as the cost was then only ninety cents, and was known by him to
be false, and that the contract was made on the faith of this representation; that the cost of production at that time was a material
element, as it would enable parties to decide whether they could
compete successfully with other producers. Objection sustained;
exception.
Defendants offered in evidence various letters from defendants to
plaintiffs, to show the course of dealing between the parties, and
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that the stipulation as to notice was waived by plaintiffs. Objec
tion sustained; exception.
The plaintiffs presented the following point: If the plautiff
was competent to deliver coal according to the contract, upon receiving notice of the quantity wanted, according to the contract, the
plaintiff was entitled to recover the amount he would have received
under the contract if the defendant had received the coal, less the
cost to the plaintiff of delivering the article, including the royalty
on the cost. Ans. The law is correctly stated in the point.
The defendants presented, inter alia, the following points: 4.
That if the jury find that the plaintiffs fraudulently and surreptitiously substituted other coal than that contracted for, of inferior
quality, and that the defendants did not learn the fact till after the
coal so delivered had been sold to their customers and consumers,
and that the substitution was made to the extent of thousands of
tons, and with the intent to defraud the defendants, such substitution would entitle the defendants to repudiate the contract and
decline to accept any further deliveries from plaintiffs themselves.
Ans. That proposition I negative in this particular suit.
5. That if the plaintiffs are entitled to recover at all, it must be
because the defendants failed to take the coal at the times at which
they should have taken it, and if so entitled, the measure of
damages is the difference between the contract price and the market
price at the times at which the defendants should have taken it
under the contract. Ans. As I have already said, I do not think
that that is the true measure of damages. I think the true measure
is (as in answer to plaintiff's point).
Verdict for plaintiffs for $20,864.88, of which a remittitur of
$3531.80 was subsequently filed, and judgment thereon. The
defendant&took this writ, assigning for error, inter alia,the rulings
on the evidence as above given and the answer to the points.
Samuel -Dicksonand J. C. Bullitt, for plaintiffs in error.
A. Sydney Biddle and B.

. Aeff-zrtrie, for defendants in error.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
TRUNKEY, J.-The Kittanning Coal Company agreed to deliver

3n board vessels at Greenwich wharves, fifty thousand tons of its
best run of mine bituminous coal, denominated Excelsior Vein, from
collieries in Clearfield county, commencing with March 1st 1874,
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and ending with February 1875, at the rate of six thousand tons
monthly, at the option of John C. Scott & Sons, they giving r otice
on or before the twenty-fifth day of each month of their requirements for the succeeding month. Scott & Sons agreed to furnish
vessels for and receive the above stated quantity of coal, and make
payment therefor, at thirty days from date of each bill of lading.
That the contract was not entire, but severable, is obvious (Lucesco
Oil Co. v. Brewer et a., 16 P. F. Smith 351; Morgan et al. v.
cKee, 27 Id. 228). The company delivered and Scott & Sons
received under this contract eighteen thousand and thirty-eight and
one-half tons of coal. This must be taken as an uncontroverted
fact. The defendants affirm it. The plaintiffs proved- it in the
first breath of their testimony; repeated it, and added that this
suit was brought to recover the damages sustained by the company
by the neglect of Scott & Sons to take (or rather call for when the
amount would have been readily supplied) the balance of the fifty
thousand tons at the price named in the contract (see their history
of the case), and in their declaration aver that they "have done all
things on their part required by the said agreement to be done, and
were always ready and willing to deliver coal pursuant to their said
contract to said defendants, and although said defendants did accept
and pay for a small quantity of said coal, to wit, ten thousand tons,
yet they, the said defendants, did not, nor would not, during the
term of the said agreement, receive the residue of said coal."
During the whole time for delivery and receiving of the coal, the
defendants gave no notice on or before the twenty-fifth of any
month, of their requirements for the succeeding month. Deliveries
were made, from time to time, as called for, beginning in March
and ending in October. This also both parties affirm.
It was the duty of the defendants to make the calls for the coal,
not exceeding six thousand tons per month, and receive the same,
so as to permit delivery of the fifty thousand tons within the time
limited. Nothing in the offers of testimony for the purpose of
showing a waiver of the requirements as to notice would warrant a
jury in finding that the defendants were relieved from making calls
so that the plaintiffs could deliver the coal within the terms of the
contract. What matters it whether proof were received of a course
of dealing, showing a waiver of notice on the twenty-fifth day of
each month, when the fact was already patent and undeniable, that
no coal was delivered or received without notice, and that such
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notice never was given on that date, but on such dates as suited
defendants' convenience ? The rulings upon those offers were not
erroneous.
When notice was given to the plaintiffs, if they were bound to
deliver at all in pursuance thereof, they were bound to deliver the
very coal designated by the contract. They could not lawfully
substitute any other without defendants' consent, and defendants
could have refused any other coal, whether inferior or superior, for
they were entitled to the specified article. If the plaintiffs stealthily
substituted inferior coal, they perpetrated a fraud upon defendants
for which they are answerable. If authority were wanting for the
foregoing, it is in the cases cited by defendants, but it is not gainsaid. It is contended by defendants that if fraudulent substitution
of coal was made in the delivery, they may now rescind the contract. The cases cited, we think, do not rule this. Where a
servant or laborer claims wages, a physician or attorney fees, an
agent or trustee commissions, fidelity lies at the bottom of the service, the breach whereof forfeits right of compensation. If two
have an executory contract, and one colludes with the other's agent
respecting its performance, or if in an agreement for sale, the price
to be paid by C., one party bribes C., the wrongdoer shall not
profit by his turpitude, nor by the agreement itself. In a sale and
delivery of goods there is not such relation of trust and confidence
as where one does service for another, and in delivery of a similar
but different article there may be no fraudulent intent, and if there
be, it is not of so heinous a nature as bribing a referee or corrupting the other's agent. True, a fraudulent delivery of one article
for another authorizes rescission of an entire contract-perhaps
would of a severable one, but not after the goods had been accepted,
paid for, and consumed. Rescission is one form of remedy for a
defrauded party which generally he may exercise upon discovery
of the fraud, though he cannot wholly restore, and if the fraud be
not discovered in time for that remedy, another remains whereby
he may recover damages. This contract was severable, and the
cdal delivered was paid for and used by defendants. They can
restore nothing. They never notified plaintiffs that they would
receive no more coal for their default in performance. We are not
convinced that there was error in holding that the appropriate
remedy for the alleged fraud, discovered at the trial, was by set-off
or action for damages.
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The pleas were "payment" and "non-as8sumpserunt." During
the trial defendants moved to amend by pleading set-off specially,
which was denied. Had notice been given under the plea of payment, the set-off could have been proved with like effect as if
specially pleaded, and, consequently, the motion was really for
leave to then give notice of special matter. Whether to allow it
was in the discretion of the Court of Common Pleas. The case
was not brought within the Act of 1806, which permits a defendant
to "alter his plea or defence, on or before the trial of the cause."
The rights of defendants under that act are well settled by LEwis,
J., in Yost v. .Eby, 11 Harris 327.
Error is assigned to the rejection of evidence of a false statement
of the president of the company as to the cost of placing coal on
board vessels at Greenwich, made in negotiations for the contract.
An action for deceit for fraudulent misrepresentation by the vendor
of the price he had paid, or of the price he had been offered, for the
subject of the contract, cannot be sustained: Hemmer v. Cooper, 8
Allen 334; Davis v. Meeker, 5 Johns. 354. The defendants rely
on Krunbhaarv. Birch, 4 Weekly Notes of Cases 144, and Short
v. Stevenson, 13 P. F. Smith 95, as ruling the point in their favor.
The former is where one sold his right, title and interest in a patent
right, for territory including Philadelphia, representing that he
owned half the patent-right, whereas he had before sold his whole
interest for Philadelphia; and the latter where one purchased land
for himself and associates, and pretended to his associates that he
had paid $12,000 for it, when he had only paid $6000.
These decisions do not touch the question, Is it a fraud for a
vendor to misstate the cost or price of the article he is selling ? The
legal answer seems as well settled as the moral one, though they
are dissimilar, and this assignment is not well taken.
By the plea of non assumpsit the defendant puts the plaintiff on
proving his whole case, and entitles himself to give in evidence anything which shows that at the time the action was commenced the
plaintiff had no right to recover: Heek v. Shener, 4 S. & R.. 248.
That action was for housekeeper's services and for goods sold, and
it was held that under the plea, evidence was admissible that the
plaintiff had embezzled goods of defendant, not as a set-off, but to
defeat the action. "As to the objection of the plaintiff being taken
by surprise, it is no greater surprise than when, under the same
plea, the defendant gives in evidence a release, infancy, or cover-
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-ure. Neither do I think there is much force in the other objection, that the matter of the evidence is not a liquidated debt or
demand. If it is of sufficient magnitude to bar the plaintiff's
action, there will be no need of going into calculations. But if not
sufficient for that purpose it is as easy for the jury in this action to
ascertain the amount to be deducted from the plaintiff's demand as
it is for the jury in an action to be brought by the defendant against
the plaintiff to ascertain the amount of his damages." Per TILGHMAN, 0. J.
Under .this plea the defendant may show that the
plaintiff is an insolvent debtor and the cause of action vested in his
trustees ; that the plaintiff accepted goods at another place than
that mentioned in the contract; a former recovery ; that the work
for which the plaintiff claims was done in an unworkmanlike
manner: Kennedy v. Ferris, 5 S. & R. 893 ; Scott v. Province, 1
Pitts. 189; Gilchrist v. Bale, 8 Watts 855: Caw v. Wolcott, 10
Barr 43. In Falconerv. Smith, 6 Harris 130, it was held that in
an action on notes given for machinery it was competent for the
defendant to prove that when the agreement was made the plaintiff
warranted the machinery to be of a certain quality, and that the
warranty had failed, though the notes were given several months
after the date of the agreement. The plea of non-assumpsit "entitles the defendant without prior special notice, to give evidence of
anything which shows ex xquo et bono the plaintiff ought not to
recover. This is emphatically true of matters of defence springing
from or immediately connected with the transaction sued on, and
impeaching the consideration of the contract averred by the plaintiff.

*

*

*

It is true that under our more recent decisions

unliquidated damages for a breach of warranty may be averred as
matter of set-off, and then a special plea or notice would be necessary; but as was justly observed in Sadler v. Slobaugh, 3 S. & R.
388, a breach of warranty may, at the option of the defendant, bo
reserved as the foundation of a separate action, or set up as a
defence going to the consideration of the assumpsit sued on." Per
BELL, J.
In various forms the defendant offered to prove that the
plaintiffs fraudulently substituted inferior coal from other mines for
that which they had contracted to deliver, and concealing this fact,
delivered the inferior article in part performance of the contract ;
that the defendants did not know at the time of such deliveries that
the coal was of this inferior character; that finding objections made
by their customers they inquired of plaintiffs and were assured by
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them that the coal delivered was of the kind stipulated, and they
accepted and paid for the same as part of the coal mentioned in
the contract, believing it to be such ; and that this fraudulent substitution involved the defendants in great loss, prevented them from
nadking sales of the balance of the coal mentioned in the contract,
and disabled them from receiving the same. At present it must be
taken as if they had the testimony at hand to establish the facts in
the offers. Had it been received it might have availed as a complete defence. The matter was immediately connected with the
transaction which is the basis of this suit; it shows a wilful injury
in the performance of part of a contract by the plaintiffs, upon
which they claim damages because the defendants failed to perform.
By the settled law of this state the offered testimony was admissible under defendants' plea of non-assmtmpserunt, not to prove a
set-off, but to prove that the plaintiffs had no right to recover.
Besides, it was again specially offered as tending to prove that
the plaintiffs were not ready and willing to deliver the coal stipulated in the contract. Why was it not admissible for this purpose?
If the company pretend they were always ready and willing to
perform, is it not evidence in rebuttal that when called on for coal
they gave it from other mines? Slight it may be in the opinion of
the court, but its weight was for the jury. We are of opinion
there was error in rejecting these offers of testimony.
The only remaining assignments we shall notice relate to the question of damages. We think the instructions of the learned judge correct, except in not considering the value of the coal in plaintiffs'
hands ; but it seems his attention was not directed to this, and we
would pass it were the cause not to be tried again. Compensation
should be the criterion in this as in other actions for breach of contract. Most frequently the simple rule, that the measure of damages
is the difference between the contract price and the market price at
the time the contract ought to have been completed, gives the injured party a fair recompense for his loss. In a case like this, that
would, be inadequate. Had the plaintiffs mined and stocked so
large a quantity of coal the loss in increased handling, waste, and
the like would not be covered by the difference between the market
tnd contract price, to say nothing of the improbability of finding a
market for the coal. The contract did not require them to mine
and stock, it was enough if they were competent to deliver the coal
according to contract, that is, had their mines in order, the miners,
VOL.
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and all necessary means to mine and deliver the coal, and were pro
vented by default of defendants. In such case nothing short of
the value of the contract would be a compensation. That would be
determined by deducting from the contract price the cost of delivery,
including the royalty and the value of the coal as it remained in
place. Possibly the coal in the opened mines, in working order
and with large capacity at the time the contract should have been
performed, was of no value to the vendors. It may have been
worth nothing above the royalty. Unless it was worthless as it
remained in place, the property of the plaintiffs, they ought not to
recover the difference between the contract price, and the sum of
the cost of delivery and royalty.
Judgment reversed and a venire facia8 de eovo awarded.
The questions involved in the foregoing case are very interesting, and it
might be instructive to see what princi-.
ples of law the courts have established
in the older as well as in the more recent
cases, under somewhat analogous circumstances.
The principles of law in the above
case are four: (1) Severable contracts
and their rescission. (2) The admissibility of the evidence of false statements
of the vendor. (3) The question of
pleading; non assumpsit, the Pennsylvauia plea of cet-off, &c. (4) The measure of damage.
1.

SEVERABLE

CONTRACTs.-The

criterion for determining whether a contract is entire or severable, is stated by
Mr. Parsons thus: "If the part to be
performed by one party is expressed by
several and distinct items, and the price
to be paid for them is apportioned to
each item to be performed, or is left
to be implied by law, such a contract
will generally be held to be severable :"
2 Pars. on Con. 29, 31. Judge WAsHINGTON, said: "Where an agreement
embraces a number of distinct subjects
which admit of being separately executed
and closed, it must be taken distributively, each subject being considered as
forming the matter of a separate agreement after it is closed :" Perkinsv. Hart,

11 Wheat. 237,251.
"It seems, therefore, that if by operation of law,"
(Sickels etal. v. Pattison, 14 Wend.
257,) "or by the terms of an agreement,
certain sums become due upon performance of certain separate parts of the work,
the consideration then is severable, and
distinct assumpsits arise, and an action
for such particular sums may be maintained on performance of such parts of
the work:" Wallace's note to Cutter v.
Powell, 2 Sm. Lead. Cas. 45, 5th Amer
ed. In Lucesco Oil Co. v. Brewer, 66
Penn. St. 351, 354, plaintiffs covenanted to advance the defendants
$75,000, for the purchase of materials
for refining oil; they also undertook to
act as agents to make guaranteed sales
for the company, "in consideration of
the advances to be made under this
agreement and services rendered in
making sales and guaranteeing the
same," the defendants agreeing to
execute a mortgage conditioned fix Ai
payment of advances, and to pay a
commission of two and a half per cent.,
and they were to have the option of
continuing the arrangement for another
year. Reid, that plaintiffs could recover
for their advances though guilty of
various breaches of their covenants in
regard to the renewal of the contract
and advances under it.
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In Lzgget v. Snith, 3 Watts 332, GIBsqN, C. J., said : "Previous to the decision in Boone v. Eyre, 1 H. Bl.273, u.A.,
it must have been taken that nothing else
than an entire performance of a mutual
covenant would entitle the party to his
acton for a breach on the other side.
In that case, however, a more reasonable
and just rule was adopted by which a
mutual or independent covenant which
goes to but a part of the coideration
on both sides, and whose breach may be
compensated in damages, is to be treated
exactly as if it were separate and independent."
This was a covenant by
which plaintiff had contracted to build
the brick work of a warehouse for
defendant and had failed, in part, so as
to make the building not so strong as
was stipulated. The building was used
after erection. Held, that the defect
did not go to the whole consideration.
In Morgan v. Meee, 77 Penn. St.
228, defendant bought four thousand
barrels of oil, by means of eight similar
papers of the same date, each for the
delivery of five hundred barrels on the
last day of consecutive months, payment
to be made on each delivery. Held, a
divisible contract, and that evidence was
inadmissible of an agreement at time
of purchase that the contract was entire,
and that the writings were executed
on that footing, and WiLLims, J., said:

"If the contract, as offered to be shown,
had been incorporated into one instrument or paper, instead of eight, as
executed by the parties, the evidence
proposed to be given would have constituted no defence to the action." See
also Quinlax v. Davis, 6 Whart. 175;
Lippuwott v. Lowo, 68 Penn. St. 317;
Oberwyer v. Nicols, 6 Biun. 159. In
the principal case the court held the
contract to be clearly severable.
"A contract in general cannot be
rescinded in toto by one of the parties,
where both cannot be placed in the
identical situation which they accepted
when the contract was made. And,

accordingly, where one partylas derived
some advantage from the other party,
having to some extent performed the
contract, the general rule is that the
agreement shall stand and that tie defendant must perform his part thereof,
and seek compensation in damages for
the plaintiffsdefanlt:" Chit. onPL, 11
Amer. ed., 1091-92.
In the principal case part of the coal
had been delivered, under the coutract,
and paid Ibr, and the court held tba the
contract could not be rescined. Bet
if thesm had been - acceptance and a
delivery of tart and no payment, theit
could be even then no rescission. The
point was decided in Bome v. Eye. I
H. Black. 273, note A. There, plaintiff
had covenanted to convey a plantation
with a stock of negroes upon it, and abi
that the plaintiff was lawfhlly possessed ;'
had a good title, and that the defendmo
should quietly enjoy. Defendant pleaded
that the grantor was not legall possesm
of the negroes on the plantation, and s.
had not a good title to convey. TM
Court of Queen's Bench held the pie t.
be ill, adding that if such a plea wen
allowed to stand, any one negro n.t
being the property of the grantor woad
bar the action; see also Duke of e.
Albans v. .e,
I H. B. 279 ; Campdlv. Jones, 6 Term Rep. 570.
Sergeant Williams laid down this re
in his notes to Pordage v. Cole, I Sauhd
Rep. 320, and the proposition has pebbably not ever been doubted since.
In Hunt v. Silk, 5 East 449, a lessor
agreed to let his house, the lessor to
repair and execute the lease within ten
days, but the lessee was to have immediate possession to execute a counter
part and to pay the rent and sum of 10I.
down. The money was paid, but *the
landlord neglected to make repairs or
execute the lease within the period of
ten days; the lessee remained in possession. Held, that the latter by quitting
the house could not rescind the contract
and recover money paid down, but cou-4
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only declare for a breach of the special
contract; for one party cannot rescind a
contract, unless bath parties can be put
in stwtu quo, as before the contract.
The court said: "If the plaintiff might
occupy the premises two days beyond
the time when the repairs were to have
been done and the lease executed, and
yet rescind the contract, why might he
not rescind the contract after a twelvemonth on the same account ? This objection cannot be got rid of; the parties
cannot be put in statu quo."
In Oxasdale v. Wetherell, 9 B. & C.
386, a vendor agreed to deliver two
hundred and fifty bushels of wheat at a
specified time, but had only delivered
one hundred and thirty bushels after the
time mentioned for the delivery of all.
The vendor brought an action of asIt
sumpsit for the wheat delivered.
was argued that the contract being entire,
there could be no recovery on it. Hed,
that even if the contract were entire, the
time for completing the contract being
expired before suit brought, there was
an action for the wheat actually delivered, though the jury found the contract
to be entire for the whole amount.

--If,"

said Lord TENTERDEN, C. J.,

'the rule contended for were to prevail,
it would follow that if there had been a
contract for two hundred and fifty bushels
of wheat, and two hundred and fortynine had been delivered to and retained
by the defendant, the vendor could not
recover because he had not delivered
the whole,"

and

PAnxE, J.,

said:

"Where there is an entire contract to
deliver a large quantity of goods, consisting of distinct parcels, within a specified time, and the seller delivers part,
he can, before the expiration of the time,
bring an action to recover the price of
that part delivered, because the purchaser
may, if the vendor failed to complete his
contract, return the part delivered. But
if he retained the part delivered, after
the seller has failed in performing his
contract, the latter may recover the

value of the goods which he has so do
livered."
In Withers v. Reynolds, 2 B. & Ad.
882, the defendant agreed to supply the
plaintiff with straw at the latter's premises, at the rate of three loads a fortnight,
during a specified time; and the plaintiff agreed to pay 33s. per load for
each load so delivered; after the straw
had been for some time delivered the
plaintiff refused to pay for the last
load delivered, and insisted in always
keeping one payment in arrear. It was
held that the defendant might rescind as
to future deliveries, on the ground that
what plaintiff said substantially amounted
to a refusal to pay for all future loads,
and PATTESON, J., said, that if plaintiff
had merely refused to pay for one load
that of itself would not have been an
excuse for the defendant in delivering
See also Fillieul v.
no more straw.
Armstrong, 7 Ad. & E. 557.
In Franklin v. Miller, 4 Ad. & E.
599, the plaintiff agreed to settle defendant's debts and to advance him a
pound a week until that was done; in
consideration of which plaintiff agreed
to repay all sums advanced him, and to
pay plaintiff 401. a quarter till the debt
should be filly settled. The breach
was that several sums of 401. were in
arrear. Plea. That as to two of the
sums of 401., the plaintiff had omitted
to pay some of the defendant's debts,
and had not paid the pound a week.
wherefore the contract was rescinded.
Held, that the plea was bad, and DENmAN, C. J., said, "that the defendant
had no right to treat the contract as
rescinded. That is illustrated by the
judgment of PATTESON, J.. in Withers v. Reynolds (ante) ;" and LITTLEDALE, J., said, "It is a clearly recognised principle that if there is only a
partial failure of performance by one
party to a contract, for which there may
be a compensation in damages, the contract is not put an end to."
In Morton v. Tibbett, 15 A. & E. (N.
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S.) 428, defendant had purchased wheat
of the plaintiff by sample and directed
that the bulk should be delivered on the
next day to a carrier named by himself,
who was to convey it to a certain town.
Defendant took the sample with him.
The next day the bulk was delivered to
the carrier, and defendant, without seeing it, resold it by the same sample, and
the carrier took it to the sub-vendee,
who ejcted it as not corresponding
with he sample. Defendant then repudiated the contract with plaintiff. The
contract was made on the 20th of August,
and note given to plaintiff on August
30th. Held, that there was evidence to
justify the jury in finding that the buyer
had accepted the goods, and received the
same, so as to take the case out of the
Statute of Frauds ; and further that the
defendant could not, after such acceptance, repudiate the contract, though the
goods were not those contracted for, and
though there had been an offer to return
the goods as soon as it was found what
they were, and before any had been used.
In Blackburn v. Srith, 2 Ex. Rep.
783, the owner of land agreed to sell it,
the vendee to have immediate possession,
the vendor to furnish a fully satisfactory
title; all objections to be waived, not
made by the purchaser within a month
after the delivery of the abstract. No
objection was made, and vendee paid deposit and took possession. Vendee then
brought suit for breach of contract in not
furnishing a sufficient abstract, also for
the deposit money he had paid down,
alleging that he rescinded the contract.
Hdd, that as no objection was made
within the (thirty days) proper time,
the abstract was good. Held, further,
that plaintiff could not rescind the contract, as possession of the land had been
taken, and the parties could not be placed
in statu quo. In this case, PAnxE B.,
said, "Further, we think, on the principles of Hunt v. Silk, inasmuch as the
plaintiffs had the possession of the property and the parties could not be placed

in statu quo, the count for money had and
received cannot be maintained, supposing
that the defendant had been guilty of a
breach of contract subsequent to the delivery of the abstract, we have not now
to decide whether such a breach has been
committed; if it was, the plaintiff's
remedy was on the contract."
In Brandt v. Lawrence, I Q. B. D
344, plaintiff, by two similar contracts,
had agreed to ship to the defendant fortyfive hundred quarters of Russian oats by
each "shipment by steamer or steamners, during February." In accordance
with the terms of the contract, they sipped on board of one steamer forty-five
hundred and eleven quarters to answer
the first contract, and eleven hundred
and thirty-nine quarters on the same
steamer to answer the second. They
subsequently shipped, but not in time, on
board another, enough to complete the
second contract.
ield, upon action
brought against the defendant for refusing to accept the eleven hundred and
thirty-nine quarters, in part fulfilment
of the second contract, that the plaintiffs could recover, notwithstanding that
the contract had only been performed in
part, and that as to the residue the shipment was too late, and MAILLISH, L. J.,

observed, "I think the legal inference is
that it was intended that the shipment
should be made in different parcels, and
that the purchaser was bound to accept
them as they came, if they were in time.
He was not entitled to wait in order to
see whether the whole was in time.
Suppose one of the ships had been lost at
sea ? It surely could not have been intended that the purchaser would bavu
been entitled to reject the whole on that
ground."
In Freeth v. Burr, Law Rep. 9 C.
P. 213, the defendant contracted to sell
to the plaintiffs two hundred and fifty
tons of pig iron at 56s. per ton ; half to
be delivered in two, remainder in four
weeks ; payment in cash four days after
delivery of each parcel. The delivery
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of the first one hundred and twenty-five
tons was not completed by the defendants
for nearly six months, and the plaintiffs
who had made urgent calls for delivery
during this time, refused to pay for this
parcel, while retaining the iron, alleging
a right to set off the loss they had sustained from being obliged to procure
other iron in consequence of the defendant's default, but they still urged the delivery of the second parcel. Defendants
treated the refusal to pay for the first
parcel as a breach of contract, and refused to deliver any more. Held, that
the mere refusal to pay for the first parcel, the price not being ultimately paid
till after an action had been brought, did
not warrant defendants in abandoning
the contract, and plaintiffs were entitled
to damages for non-delivery of the second parcel.
In this case the chief justice referred
to the case of Hoare v. Rennie, 5 Hurlst.
& N. 19, which was somewhat doubted
in Simpson v. Crippin, and said, "Nonpayment on the one hand, or non-delivery on the other, may amount to such
an act, or may be evidence for a jury of
an intention wholly to abandon the con.ract and set the other party free. That
is the true principle on which Heare v.
Rennie was decided, whether rightly or
not upon the facts, I will not presume to
say. Where by the non-delivery of part
of the thing contracted for the whole object of the contract is frustrated, the
party making default renounecs on his
part all the obligations of the contract.
That is the ground in which it is said in
Jonassohn v. Young (infra), that that
case may be supported."

And KEAT-

ING, J., said, "It is not a mere refusal
or omission of one of the contracting parties to do something which he ought to
do that would justify the other in repudiating the contract, but there must be an
absolute refusal to perform his part of
the agreement. Non-payment is an element. But looking at the circumstances
of the case-a rising market, a failure

to deliver the iron according to tie con
tract, and a refusal to pay for the iron
delivered, not only accompanied by remonstrances but with a request to the
seller to fix a day for the delivery of certain quantities-I do not think they
show an intention on the part of the
plaintiffs to abandon the contract. As
upon the facts there appears to have
been not only no absolute refusal to perform the contract by the plaintiffs, and
what is more important, no evidence of
inability on their part to perform it, I
think the defendant had no right to treat
the contract as rescinded."
In Ex parts Chalmers, Law Rep. 8
Chan. App. 293, it was held that where
the contract was to-deliver three hundred
and thirty tons of bleaching powder, to
be delivered thirty tons per month, payment to be made in cash fourteen days
after each delivery, though the vendor
might, after a partial delivery, refuse to
deliver any more under the contract,
upon the vendee's notifying him of his
insolvency, until the instalments due foi
the part deliverd had been paid by the
insolvent vendee, yet neither the nonpayment of one month's instalments by
the latter, nor his bankruptcy alone
would entitle the rendor to rescind the
IMELLISH, L. J., said during
contract.
the case, "I admit that the mere nonpayment of the price of the November
instalment did not of itself give a right
to the vendor to refuse to perform the
contract; and I agree with what was said
by CRODtPTOW, J., in Griffiths v. Perry,
(I E. & E. 689), that the mere fact of
the insolvency of the purchaser did not
put an end to the.contract. It would
certainly be very unfair if it had that
effect; for if the insolvent had any beneficial contracts .remaining, it would be
hard on him, as well as on his creditors
if they should not have the benefits of
those contracts." This case was followed in Morgan v. Bain, Law Rep.
10 C. F. 25, in which, under similar
facts, KEATING, J., said, "Neither the

SCOTT v. KITTANINR]G COAL CO.
insolvency of the purchaser nor any other
of the circumstances of the case, would
have that effect" (i. e., the dissolution of
a contract to deliver two hundred tons
of iron, to be delivered twenty-five tons
psr month, at 51. per ton), and BRxr,
J., said, "If there be no insolvency, the
defendants could not have resisted making a delivery in May, on the ground
that the plaintiffs had not insisted on any
delivery in April, and would not have
been ready to take delivery or pay the
price of the iron, if the defendants had
insisted on delivering. That was decided in Freeth v. Burr, supra."
Observe, also, the bearing of the
American cases. It was held in McCulloch v. Scott, 13 B. MAon. 172, that retaining property and using it after refusal
of tender in rescission is a waiver of the
right to rescind.
In MIner v. Bradley, 22 Pick. 457,
the court said there can be no rescission
for partial delivery, if the part delivered
is retained; nor if more of the article is
used than is necessary to test the article,
as being in accordance with the warranty; M3ayer v. Dwindl, 29 Vt. 298.
Until a redelivery on an exchange no
right of action arises as for a rescission:
Norton v. Young, 3 Greenl. 30 ; Rutter
v. Blake. 2 Har. J. 353. Rescission
must be in tote to restore the parties to
their original condition: Buchenau v.
Horney, 12 Ill. 336 ; Junkine v. Simpson,
14 Ale. 364; Shields v. Pettee, 2 Sanf.
262 ; Eisher v. Conant, 3 E. D. Smith
199.
In many cases the breach of an important contract has been held compensable
in damages, where the rescission has
been sought before any performance, and
thence not entitling the parties to rescind. Thus in Bettini v. Gye, 4 L. R.
Q. B. Div. 183, plaintiff, an Italian
singer, had agreed to give a certain number of concerts, and to be in London for
the purpose of rehearsal, six days before
the first concert; and the question was
whether plaintiff's absence for four of the

six days entitled defendant to rescind,
the plea alleging that it was necessary
that the rehearsals should have been attended during those days. Held, by the
Queen's Bench, BLACKBURN, J., giving
the opinion, that the plaintiff could recover, the covenant being an independent one, the breach of which was compensable in damages.
The rule which the foregoing series
of cases has very plainly laid down, is
not altered by the fact that a different
article has been substituted for what
was sold, if part has been retained by
the purchaser. Thus there cannot be a
retention of so much as corresponds to
the warranty and rescission as to the
residue: Sigerson v. Harker, 15 Me.
101; Woodruff v. Peterson, 51 Barb.
252; nor can the vendee rescind because
the article was different from what was
sold, if part be consumed: Lyon v.
Bertram, 20 How. 149; .Temison v.
Woodruff, 34 Ala. 143; nor for mere
inferiority of quality to that stipulated
for: Hoadley v. House, 32 Vt. 179.
There can be no rescission even where
the contract has been induced by fraud
if the property received has been disposed
of, though this was done before discovery
of the fraud. The remedies are an
action for the fraud, or a reduction of
the price sued for: McCrillis v. Carlton,
37 Vt. 139.
This rule has been applied even where
forged notes were given for the price.
The vendor having sold the notes, the
sale took away the right to rescind:
Whitford v. Chace, 7 R. I. 322.
So in Morse v. Brackett, 98 1Mass. 205,
the court held that there cannot be a
partial rescission for fraud, or any otbet
reason when part is retained. Here the
retention was only of the bag having
marks, which had contained the article.
In the principal case there had been
part performance of a severable contract,
and the thing received had been paid for
and consumed, and the court held that
the fact that another article had been
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substatuted for that contracted for, did
not give the right to rescind, but that
the proper remedy was by set-off, or an
action for damages.
Had this substitution even been fraudulent, it could have made no difference.
'ifuKmEr, J., said in the case: "True,
a fraudulent delivery of one article for
another authorizes rescission of an entire
contract-perhaps would of a severable
one, but not after the goods had been
accepted, paid for and consumed."
And this view is in accord with the
English cases. In Clarke v. Dikson
etat., Ell., Bi. & Ellis 148, plaintiff had
been induced by representations made
by defendants to take shares in a copper
mining company, and to pay deposits
therefor. The mine was worked for
three years and dividends were declared,
plaintiff taking fresh allottments of
shares in lieu thereof. The affair was
wound up, and plaintiff for the first time
discovered that the representations were
false by which he was induced to make
he contract, and that the dividends
were also fraudulent. This action was
brought to recover deposits paid for
shares. Lord CAM[PBELL nonsuited the
plaintiff. CROMPTON, J., said : "When
you enunciate the proposition that a
party has the right to rescind, you involve in it the qualification, if the state
of things is such that he can rescind.
If you are fraudulently induced to buy
a cake you may return it, and get back
the price, but you cannot both eat your
cake and return your cake."
The
plaintiff replied that the dividends were
in themselves fraudulent, and that it
could not be said that this fresh fraud
put the defendant in a better situation.

injustice, but he may bring an action on
the deceit and recoverhis real damage."
ERLm, J., said: "The plaintiff cannot
avoid the contract under which he took
shares, because he cannot restore them
inthe same state as when he took them."
Caomror, J., finally said: "When
once it is settled that a contract induced
by fraud is not void, but voidable at the
option of the party defrauded, it seems
to me to follow that when the party
exercises his option to rescind the contract, he must be in a state to rescind;
i.e., he must be in such a situation as
to be able to put the parties into their
original state before the contract. * * *
The plaintiff must rescind in toto, or not
at all; he cannot both keep the shares
and recover the price."
In Jonassohn v. Young, 4 B. & S.
296, the plaintiff had agreed to sell
and deliver as many of the plaintiff's
gas coals, equal in quality to a cargo
before shipped on trial, as one steamvessel, to be sent by the defendant, could
fetch in nine months from S. ; breach, that
defendant refused to send the vessels to
fetch the divers cargoes of coal; plea,
that before the breach the plaintiffs had
broken the contract by not sending the
gas coal equal to the cargo shipped, and
unfit for defendant's purposes; also,
that the vessels sent had been detained
an unreasonable time by the plaintiff.
On demurrer both pleas were held bad.
WEIGHTMAN, J., said, in answer to
the proposition that defendant could
rescind when he discovered the inferiority of the coal: "But suppose the
plaintiff intended in future to send such
coal as was stipulated for ;" and CROArPTON, J., said: "The vice of the pleas
Lord CAmPBE L said: "For three is the same, that the breach goes only
years the plaintiff has had the chance of to part of the consideration."
profit. Do you say that in the case
In the last case in England on the
put of the lottery ticket, you could re- subject, Heilburt v. Hickson, L. I. 7
turn it after it had turned up blank? I" C. P. Cas. 438, defendants, shoe
manuCaoaiPTOW, J., said further: "All
facturers in England, had contracted
remedy is not lost. He can no longer during the Franco-German war to supply
rescind the contract, which would work the plaintiffs thirty thousand nair, of
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army shoes, similar to a sample, to be
delivered in weekly quantities; quality
to be approved before shipment; payment
in cash at time of delivery. Plaintiffs
were London merchants. The shoes
were sent to France and found to contain
paper in the soles, and were rejected by
thv French authorities. An agreement
wbs entered into by the plaintiflS and
defendants that all those shoes should be
sent back, which were found to contain
paper, as they were not fit for a campaign, provided this occurred in large
numbers. Finally, the plaintiffs threw
up the contract, and sued for the profit,
they might have made, if the shoes had
been delivered according to the contract.
The court held, that but for the supplemental agreement, the plaintiff could
not have rejected the shoes after having
dpalt with them as their own property,
though they could not discover the fraud
except by cutting open and ruining the
stioes. The plaintiffs were allowed to
rescind, because the jury found that not
only those shoes already delivered, but
those ready to be delivered, were not
equal to the sample, and that this could
not be discovered by any inspection that
could reasonably have been made. But
the court did not imply that if the remainder of the shoes could have been
delivered equal to the sample, that there
could have been a recission.
BRETT, J., dissented from the opinion,
but not from the judgment, on the
ground that the plaintiffs having had no
adequate means of inspection till the
shoes were delivered and paid for, could
rescind, after payment, if they exercised
their option immediately on the discovery
of the fraud.
2. FALSE REPRESENTATIONS BY
VENDOR.-It was decided in the prin-

cipal case, that the evidence of a false
statement by the vendor of the cost of
the article sold, was not admissible.
In Hemmer v. Cooper, 8 Allen (Mass.)
.84, it was held that an action for deceit
in the sale of real estate cannot be susVOL. XX=.L-54

rained by proof of fraudulent misrepre.
sentations as to the price paid for it by
the vendor. CtAjrx, , J., said: "The
representations of the vendor of real
estate, to the vendee, as to the price
which he paid for it, are to be regarded
in the same light as representations as to
its value; a purchaser ought not to re y
upon them, for it is settled that even
when false, and uttered to deceive, they
furnish no ground of action. See also
Medbury v. Watson, 6 Mete. 246, and
cases there cited.
In Davis v. Meeker, 5 Johns. (N. Y.)
354, the defendant had falsely asserted
that he had been frequently offered by
different persons $50 for a wagon, by
reason of which plaintiff was induced
to believe the wagon was worth that
sum, whereas, it was not. Plaintiff had
not tried the wagon. Held, no action
lay for fraudulent misrepresentations.
In Cronk v. Cole, 10 Ind. 485, a
fraudulent misrepresentation as to the
market price of grain, by the vendor at
the time of the sale, will not entitle the
vendee to rescind the contract in the
absence of a warranty.
3. M ASURE OF DAXeAGE.--In the
principal case, the court said that compensation is the true criterion for damages in actions for breach of contract,
and is ordinarily attained by taking the
difference between the contract price and
the market price at the time the contract
ought to have been fulfilled, but this
measure is not always sufficient. In
such a case as the present one, the measure of damage is determined by deductin.g from the contract price the cost of
delivery, including the royalty and the
value of the coal as remained in place.
4. PLEADINGS.-Non as4sumpsit-Se.
off.-The court held that, under the
plea of non assumpsit, the defendant is
entitled to show anything, by reason of
which, ex zquo a bono, the plaintiff ought
not to recover.
In a suit, therefore, on a severable con.
tract for damages for non-acceptance of
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a portion of the article contracted to be the term of the general issue will become
how.
taken, under the plea of non asbumpsit, less appropriate." This rule was,
so
Pennsylvania,
in
adopted
never
ever,
part
the
in
that,
evidence is admissible
be offered
performance another article was fraudu- that the evidence that may
lently substituted for that contracted for, under the plea of non asswnpsit is as unand that the defendant thereby suffered limited' as it formerly was in England,
geninjury, not as a set off, but to show that and as the general issue is the most
plainthe
of
is,
there
denial
of
kind
eral
also,
the plaintiff has no right to recover;
m
evidence may be admitted to show that tiff's right of action, it would seem
have
should
evidence
this
that
follow
the plaintiffs were not ready and willing
properly been admitted, because it certo deliver.
tainly does show the plaintiff had no
case,
principal
the
in
In this ruling
this, of
the court were probably right. This right to recover. In England
and
erroneous,
been
have
might
course,
issue
general
form of traverse, the
"appears," says Stephen in his work in those states where any such similar
adopted.
on Pleading, p. 155, "to have been rule of pleading has been
tresso called because the issue that it The general issue, in actions of
a much more
tenders, involving the whole declaration, pass, however, had always
case,
or the principal part of it, is of a more limited effect than in actions on the
could be shown
general and comprehensive kind than and therefore nothing
an action of
that usually tendered by a common under the general issue in
the plaintraverse. But as by the provisions of trespass, but a direct denial of
specially
be
must
else
all
allegation,
tiff's
recent rules of court (Hill. Term, 4 Will.
4), .amore limited effect will hereafter pleaded.
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be allowed to such issues than formerly,
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Complainants put to election between two suits pending, one in this court and the
other in the Circuit Court of the United States for this district.
The latter court is not a foreign court.
A party may be compelled to elect between a suit here and one in a foreign court.
One of several defendants may call for such election after he has answered.
That there are parties, both complainant and defendant, in this suit in this court,
who were not parties in the suit in the federal court, will not prevent this court from
requiring such election, where the object of beth suits and the relief sought are, in
the main, identical.
Such election may, after answer, be enforced by order, upon motion.
Complainants required to elect within eight days after service of the order.

BILL for relief. On motion that complainants elect.
J. P. Stockton, Attorney-General, B.
McCarter,for the motion.

Gilchrist and T. N.
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_1 T. Frelinghuysen and B. Williamson, contra.
RMTWNON, Chancellor.-This bill was filed in 1879 by The Central
Railroad Co. of New Jersey, The American Dock Co., Francis S.
Lathrop, receiver for the creditors and stockholders of the former
company, and John C. Van Home against The New Jersey West
Line Railroad Co., William L. Lamed, receiver for the creditors and
stockholders of that company, The Trustees for the Support of
Public Schools, Asa Packer, Lloyd Chamberlain and others. Its
object is to obtain relief against a certain grant of land under water,
made by the state to the West Line Railroad Company. That
company, and its receiver, are made parties because of the interest
of the former as grantee, and the Trustees for the Support of
Public Schools, because of a mortgage held by them, given for
part of the consideration money of the grant. Under a decree of
foreclosure of that mortgage, obtained in this court, the premises in
question were sold, December 26th 1878, and at the sale were purchased by Lloyd Chamberlain. The sale was set aside on the
ground of surprise.
The bill according to its own statement is filed to have the
sale perpetually enjoined and to have the grant declared invalid
and void, to restrain any one claiming or to claim thereunder
from setting up such title against the complainants, and from
disturbing the complainants in their possession of the property,
and to remove the cloud which the grant casts upon the complainants' title.
On the 10th of January 1876, a bill in equity was filed in the
Circuit Court of the United States for the district of New Jersey,
by John Taylor Johnston, claiming, as grantee of the Central Railroad Company, and the Dock Company, against the West Line
Railroad Company, the Trustees for the Support of Public Schools,
and William L. Lamed, receiver, for relief against the grant and
the mortgage. In that suit a preliminary injunction was obtained,
on the 5th of May 1876, prohibiting the defendants therein from
proceeding to sell the premises, and from disturbing the possession
of Mr. Johnston until the further order of the court. That injunction was dissolved in 1878, on the ground, as stated in the rule,
that by force of the statute it continued in force only until the
next term after it was granted, and had not been renewed. The
premises were subsequently sold under the decree of foreclosure in
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this court before mentioned, and were purchased by Chamberlain.
Some of the defendants in this cause, who are not parties defendant
to the suit in the United States Court, are made parties by reason
of their interest as holders of liens or encumbrances on the premises
under the West Line Railroad Company, and the rest by. reason of
their interest under the sale in foreclosure.
The bill in this suit states that the suit in the federal court was,
in fact, instituted by the Central Railroad Co., and the Dock Co.,
through John Taylor Johnston; that the conveyances by those corporations to him, under which alone he derived his title, were made
merely for the purpose of giving jurdisdiction to the federal courts,
in order that those corporations might thus (in view of the interest
of the state in the controversy) be enabled to avail themselves of
those c ,urts as a forum for the litigation of the question in dispute.
It seems undeniable, and, indeed, it is not questioned, that this suit
is, so far as those corporations are concerned, for the identical cause,
and for precisely the same relief as the suit in the federal court,
except as to the sale under foreclosure, which occurred subsequently to the institution of the latter suit. There is, indeed, an
additional complainant, John C. Van Home, here. He makes
common cause with the complainant corporations, because he is
(though independently of them) affected by the same grant against
which they seek relief. Motion is made that the complainant corporations elect in which forum, the federal or state, they will proceed. The suit in the federal court appears to have rested since
the dissolution of the injunction, which took place on the 30th of
November 1878.
The complainants' counsel insist that the objection under consideration is 4ot valid, and that, if made by answer, as it in fact is,
it cannot avail the defendants before the final hearing; and if the
defendants would avail themselves of it before final hearing on the
merits, they must do so by plea, and that, therefore, the motion
cannot prevail. They further insist that the mere pendency of a
suit for the same cause in a foreign court, or in a court of the
United States, cannot be pleaded in abatement or in bar to a proceeding in a state court. The defendants, in whose behalf the
motion is made, The Trustees for the Support of Public Schools,
have answered.
A complainant who has two suits, one at law and the other in
equity, or both in equity, pending for the same cause, at the samo
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time, will be put to his election, except in the case of foreclosure
of mortgage, in which case both a suit at law and a suit in equity,
at the same time, may be maintained. Story's Eq. Pl., § 736;
Way v. Bragaw, 1 C. E. Gr. 213; Conover's .Ex'r. v. Conover,
Sax. 403; AMc.Ewen v. Broadhead,3 Stock. 129; lioore v. Grubbs,
3 B. Mon. (Ky.) 77 ; Brown v. Wallace, 2 Bland 585,601. And
the defendant may call for the election as soon as he has filed his
answer.
In iitchell v. Bunch, 2 Paige 606, cited by complainants'
counsel, there was a suit at law in the federal court, and a suit in
equity in chancery of the state of New York. Though the chancellor, indeed, said that the mere pendency of a suit in a foreign
court, or in a court of the United States, could not be pleaded in
abatement or bar to a proceeding in a state court, he, at the same
time, refused to regard the Circuit Court of the United States,
sitting within the limits of his state, as a foreign court, and he
also intimated that, had the notice in the suit before him been properly framed, he would have required an election, and, in fact, he
did require the complainant to elect between bail in the federal
court and ne exeat in the state court.
The right to put the complainant to an election is not confined
to suits brought in our own courts; but he may be compelled to elect
whether he will proceed in this or in a foreign court: 1 Hoffm. Ch.
Pr. 343 ; 1 Barb. Ch. Pr. (2d revised ed.) 247 ; Pietersv. Tiomp.
son, Cooper 294.
In Lathrop Sewing Machine Co. v. Bond and Lathrop A3anufacturing Co., in this court, in 1868, the complainants were
required, before answer filed, to elect between a suit in equity in
New York and that suit.
If, in this case, the complainants should be permitted to proceed
in both courts, there might result decrees diametrically opposite to
one another and a conflict of jurisdiction. If so, which decree
would prevail? Apart from the other considerations appropriate
to the decision of this question, it is the policy of the federal and
state courts to avoid such conflicts: New Jersey Zinc (Co. v.
FranlinIron (o., 2 Stew. 422.
According to the practice, the complainants may be put to their
election after answer, by order, upon motion: Way v. Bragaw, ubi
8upra; Gild. For. Rom. 196; Dan. Ch. Pr. (4th Am. ed.) 815;
(onover's B.'r v. Conover, ubi supra.
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Manifestly, it is the dictate of justice that the Trustees for the
Support of Public Schools should be spared the necessity of
defending both suits. In the main, the prayer of each bill is precisely the same and the relief sought in each suit identical. The
fact that there are other defendants in this suit than those in the
suit in the federal court, or that there is another complainant here
besides those who were the real complainants there, will not prevent
this court from requiring the election: Story's Eq. P1., § 738;
Dows v. Hcichael,6 Paige 139; Gardnerv. 1?aisbeck, 1 Stew.
71.
The complainant corporations should be required to elect.
There will accordingly be an order that they elect within eight days
after service of the order. Such is the practice: Boyd v. Heinzelman, 1 Yes. & Bea. 381; Rogers v. Voburgh, 4 Johns. Ch. 84.
If they elect to proceed in the federal court, the bill in this suit
will be dismissed as to them, with costs, and if they elect to proceed
here, they will be required to dismiss their bill in the federal court
as a condition precedent to doing so.
Disagreement among the cases has
arisen from the application rather than
from any question as to the soundness of,
the rule, that where a party has two
remedies for a wrong, and attempts to
pursue both simultaneously, the court, on
the defendant's application, will require
him to elect which one to prosecute. As
concurrent suits at law and in equity:
Simpson v. Sad, 16 C. B. 26; 3 N. J.
L. J. 67 ; Gambsby v. Ray, 52 N. H.
513; Laraussini v. Carquette, 24 Miss.
151 ; Cocke v. Dotson, I Tenn. 171 ;
Pittsburgh Railroad v. Mt. Pleasant
Railroad, 76 Penn. St. 481; Singer v.
Scott, 44 Ga. 659; Rogers v. Hoskins,
15 Ga. 270; Blair v. Cary, 9 Wis.
543; Cole v. Flitcraft, 47 Md. 312.
See Kirby v. Jackson, 42 Vt. 552.
The rule applies to suits for penalties.
Commonwealth v. Churchill, 5 Mass. 174;
State v. California Co., 13 Nev. 289.
See Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 6 J. J.
Marsh. 184; Jones v. Clay, I Bos. & P.
191.

It has been held that a suit at law could
not be stayed on account of a pending

suit in equity: Murphy v. Cadell, 2 Bos.
& P. 137; Blanchard v. Stone, 16 Vt.
234; Peak v. Bull, 8 B. Mon. 428 ;
HUumphries v. Dawson, 38 Ala. 204;
Williamson v. Paxton, 18 Gratt. 475,
nor a suit in chancery, on account ot a
pending action at law: Black v. Lackey,
2 B. Mon. 257. See Davis v. Salter,
2 Cr. & J. 466; Insurance Co. v. Brune,
6 Otto 588.
An exception to the rule is, that a
mortgagee may foreclose his mortgage
and sue on the bond at the same time:
Jones on Mort., H 1215-1220; Copperthwait v. Dummer, 3 Harrison's 258:
M1organ v. Sherwood, 53 Ill. 171 :
although, as Chancellor CooPEn says, in
Franklin v. Hersch, 3 Tenn. Ch. 469,
the reason of the exception is nowhere
clearly stated; and in Onderdonk v.
Gray, 4 C. E. Green 69, Chancellor
ZABRISKIE denied a complainant his costs
on foreclosure; and in some cases such
double remedy has been refused altogether: State Bank v. Wilson, 9 Ill. 57.
There are other occasional exceptions
which allow both remedies (Lee v. Long,
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Wightw. 72; Haskins v. Lombard, 16
Me. 140: Kittredgev. Race, 2 Otto 116;
Fisk v. Union Pacific etilroad Co., 8
Blatdh. 299; Ecans v. Lingle, 55 Ill.
455) ; as an admiralty le&and suit for
the debt: Ye v. Tatem, L. R. 3 P. C.
696, and cases cited; Russelv. Alvarez,
5 Cal. 48: Grangerv. Judge, 27 Mich.
406, and cases cited; The Mali Ire, L.
R. 2 Ad. & Ec. 356; The Kalorama,
10 Wall. 204; and see Wood v. Fithian,
4 Zab. 838; Sawyer v. Eastern Co., 46
Mc. 400; or bringing an action for
matters previously submitted to an arbitration which is still pending: Knaus v.
.lenkins. 11 Vt. 288.
As to concurrent remedies on other
lien%, see Embree v. Hanna, 5 Johns.101 ;
American Bank Y. Rollins. 99 Mass.
313; Thielmnan Y. Carr, 75 111. 385;
Barker v. Amark, 3 Beav. 64 ; Hecker
v. JMitehell, 6 Duer 687 ; Laurence v.
Remington, 6 Biss. 44; 1Vurtz v. Hart,
13 Iowa 515 ; Monroe v. jastleman, 3 A.
K. Marsh. 399.
As to a .pecial or qualified election,
Fee Frank7inv. ler.,ch, 3 'enn. Ch. 467
Thompson v. G,'ralhm, I Paige 452.
A suit in a foreign court, however,
doe not always compel the plaintiff to
elct: lfe..t v. McConnecl, 5 La. 424 :
Chatzel v. Bolon, 3 M'Cord 33; Barnes
v. Wilbtt, 19 How. Pr. 566 ; Davis v.
Mlorton, 4 BuIli 442 ; Grider v. APperson, 32 Ark, 332 ; Allen v. Watt, 69
I1. 655; Williants v. Ayrault, 31 Barb.
4
365; Ogo' v. Maguire, 61 Id. 54;
Burrowi v. Miller, 5 How. Pr. 51;
Smith v. Lathrop, 44 Penn. St. 326;
Humnphries v. Dawson, 38 Ala. 199
De Armond v. Bohn, 12 Ind. 607 ; Ydverton v. Conant, 18 N. H. 123; Trabue
v. Short, 5 Cold. 293; Vilson v. Ferand, L. R. 13 Eq. 362; Cox v.
Mitchell, 7 C. B. N. S. 55. See, also,
McLme v. Manning, Winst. N. C.
Eq. 60; McGilrray v. Avery, 30 Vt.
59R) ; and in this aspect the English
:uases are said to regard the courts of
Scotland: Cowan v. Braidwood, 1 Man.

& Gr. 382; Russell v. Smyth, 9 M. &
W. 810 ; Venn;ng v. Loyd, 1 Do G., F.
& J. 193; Carron Iron (!a. v. M1aclaren,
5 H. of L. Cas. 416 ; Ireland : Sheehj
v. LZfe Assurance Co., 3 C. B. N. S.
597; Alexander v. Adams, 16 L. T.
N. S. 384; Jamaica: Bayley v. Ed.
wards, 3 Swanst. 703; Newfbundland :
Henley v. Soper, 8 B. & C. 16; Foster
v. Passall,3 Atk. 587; Canada: Younn
v. Barclay, 5 H. of L. Cas. 431 n.; New
South Wales: Bank of Australasia v.
Nius, 16 Ad. & E. N. S. 717; the
island of Grenada: Farquharsonv. Seton,
5 Russ. 45; India : Ostell v. Lepage,
DeG. & Sm. 95, 2 DeG. M. & G. 892;
Wales: Iorgan v. , 1 Atk. 408;
the consular court at Constantinople :
Barber v. Lamb, 8 C. B. N. S. 95;
the United States: Cox v. 1ite ell, 7 C.
B. N. S. 55.
As to suits in other counties of the
same states. see Caywell v. Suddreth, 77
N. C. 287. Also, federal courts in districts outside of the state where the action
is pending: Cook v. Lichfield, 5 Sandf.
330: Logd v. Reynolds, 29 Ind. 299;
Brooks v. Mills Co., 4 )ill. 524; Lawrence v. Reminqton, 6 Biss. 44; Stanton
v. Embrey, 3 Otto 548; Insurance Co.
v. Brune, 6 Id. 588.
Where the federal court is held in the
same district as the state court, the cases
are conflicting: those maintaining that
they are even then foreign, are : Vadleigh v. Veazie, 3 Sumn. 165 ; White v.
Whitman, I Curt. 494 ; L ringv. Marsh,
2 Cliff. 311 ; Parsonsv. Greenville Railroad, 1 Hughes 279; Bininger's Case, 7
Blatch. 168; Greenwood v. Rector, I
Hempst. 708 ; while those holding the
contrary are: PreRbyterian Church v.
White, 4 Am. Law Reg. 526; Earl v.
Raymond, 4 McLean 233; Smith v. Atlantic Insurance Co., 2 Fost. (N. H.) 21 .
Nelson v. Foster, 5 Biss. 44; Wood v.
Lake, 13 Wis. 84; lVurtz v. Hart, 13
Iowa 515 ; Whitridge'v. Taylor, 66 N.
C. 273; McConnell v. Stettinius, 7 Ill.
707; Mitchell v. Bunch, 2 Paige 606
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See Hatch v. Spoj'ord, 22 Conn. 495;
Baruey v. Patterson, 6 Har. & Johns.
182; Williams v. Wikes, 14 Penn. St.
228 ; Cunningham v. Campbell, 3 Tenn.
CI. 488.
After a suit begun in one state, the
plaintiffs sued for the same cause in
another, and pursued it to judgment,Held, that the judgment was a bar to the
first suit: North Bank v. Brown, 50 Me.
214; also Baxley v. Linah, 16 Penn. St.
241 ; Painev. Shenectady InsuranceCo.,
11 R. 1. 411.
One of several defendants, without
the concurrence of the others, has the
right to compel an election : Bradford v.
Williams, 2 Md. Ch. 1.
The second suit must be for substantially the same subject-matter: Carlislev.
Cooper, 3 C. E. Green 241 ; M&facey v.
Childress, 2 Tenn. Ch. 23 ; Rattenbury v.
Fenton, Coop. temp. Brough. 60; McEwen v. Broadhead, 3 Stock. 129;
Davison v. Johnson, 1 C. E. Green 112;
Ballou v. Ballou, 26 Vt. 673; Calaveras
Co. v. Brockway, 30 Cal. 325 ; Bradford
T.
dJliams, 2 Md. Ch. 1; Sullings v.
Goodyear Co., 36 Mich. 313; McRae v.
Singleton, 35 Ala. 297 ; Flint v. Spurr,
17 B. Mon. 513; and brought by the
same parties, or in the same right: Higgins v. York Co., 2 Atk. 44 ; Henry v.
Goldney, 15 M. & W. 494; Nunn v.
T
Lomer, 13 Jur. 236 ; 1I
rie v. Prowse, 9
Price 393 ; Sowter v. Dunston, 1 M. &
Ry. 508 ; Fulton v. Golden, 10C.
L.
Gr.
353; Botts v. Cozine, 2 Edw. Ch. 583;
Walsworth v. Johnson, 41 Cal. 61 ; Beach
v. Norton, 8 Day 71 ; Cole v. Butter, 43
Me.- 401; &ern's Case, 14 Ala. 597;
Adams v. Gardiner, 13 B. Mon. 197 ;
Atkinson v. State Bank, 5 Blackf. 84;
Dawson v. Vaughn, 42 Ind. 395 ; 0' Connor v. Blake, 29 Cal. 312; Fisk v.
Union Pacific Railroad Co., 8 Blatch.
299 ; Davis v. Hunt, 2 Bailey 412 ; Paul
v. Hurlbert, 5 Rep. 738; Osborn v.
ClouA 23 Iowa 104 ; Chase v. Bank, 56
Penn. St. 355 ; New EnglandScrew Co.

v. Bliven, 3 Blateh. 240. See Gratw
v. Dale, 1 Mon. 190; McConnell T.
Stettinius, 7 Ill. 707; Thomas v. Frelove, 17 Vt. 138; Blackburn v. Watson,
85 Penn. St. 241; Parsonsv. Greenville
Co., I Hughes 279.
The pendency of another suit cannot
be shown without pleading it: Percival
v. Hickey, 18 Johns. 257; White v.
Talmage, 35 N. Y. S. C. 223; Rizer v.
Gilpatrick, 16 Kan. 564; Anderson
v. Barry, 2 J. J. Marsh. 281 ; Hixon v.
Schooley, 2 Dutch. 461. See, however,
Haigh v. Paris, 16 M. & W. 144; Bissill v. Williamson, 7 Hurlst. & N. 391 ;
and it may be set up by answer or demurrer or plea: HornJhgerv. Hornfager,
6 How. Pr. 279; Morton v. Sweetser,
12 Allen 134; Curd v. Lewis, 1 Dana
351; Patterson v. Mercer, 23 Ind. 16;
Schenck v. Schenck, 5 Hal. 276. See
Blanchardv. Stone, 16 Vt. 234.
But the plaintiff need not elect until after the defendant has answered. Semmes
v. Mott, 27 Ga. 92 ; Dunlap v. .Newman,
52 Ala. 178; and may then proceed by
motion or petition: Freeman v.'Staats, 4
Hal. Ch. 814.
Semble, the motion must be made in the
last suit. Ratzer v. Ratzer, 2 Abb. N.
C. 461 ; Nicholl v. Mason, 21 Wend.
339; Bank of U. S. v. Merchants' Bank.
7 Gill 415; Sherwood v. Hammond, 4
Blackf. 504; Renner v. Marshall, 1
Wheat. 215 ; Haight v. Holley, 3 Wend.
258. See Morton v. Webb, 7 Vt. 123;
Williamson v. Paxton, 18 Gratt. 475.
After an election to proceed in one
court, the party cannot object to its jurisdiction. McBroom v. Wiley, 2 Hisk.
58; Mortimore v. Soares, I E. & E.
399; Harrism v. Harrison, 39 Ala. 489.
As to waiver of an election, see Wel.
chel v. Thompswn, 39 Ga. 559; Vash.
burn v. Great West Ins. Co., 114 Mass
175 ; Kittredge v. Race, 2 Otto 116.
JOHN H. STEWART.
Trenton, N. J.
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The granting of a preliminary injunction is a matter of discretion,
and even
where the complainant's right is clear, yet, if the injury to defendant
by granting
the injunction would be very great in proportion to the injury to the
complainant by
refusing it, the court may in its discretion refuse.
There is no difference in these respects between injunctions in patent
right or
copyright and other cases.
Whether a copyright granted to a foreigner, for a work written by an
American
citizen, and purchased before publication and copyrighted by the foreigner,
is valid,
qutre.

Whether a citizen who has copyrighted a short paper, and has allowed
it to be
published in a foreign country as a part of a much larger work (e.
g., an encyclo-

lIedia), can use his copyright to prevent the republication in this country
of the
work, qucere.

THE SE were several suits in equity brought to restrain the defendants, publishers of the American reprint of the Encyclopoedia
Britannica, from publishing in Vol. X. of the said reprint certain
articles, which it was claimed were duly copyrighted in the United
States.
The "Encyclopedia Britannica, Ninth edition," is a foreign
work published by the persons trading as A. & C. Black, in Edinburgh, Scotland. It is announced as a work to be published in
twenty-one volumes. Vol. I. of the ninth edition was issued in
Edinburgh early in the year 1875 ; the publication has now reached
the tenth volume. The work was imported into the United States,
and sold at $9 a volume. The several volumes were issued without notice of copyright.
Soon after Vol. I. appeared, an American publisher, Joseph M.
Stoddart, Jr., trading as J. M. Stoddart & Co., the above defendant, announced his intention to bring out an American reprint
of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, to be issued in volumes as the
corresponding volumes of the foreign edition should appear. The
American edition was put upon the market and sold as a "subscription book," that is, by subscription, at 85 a volume. The
American edition met with great success, and the foreign pubVOL.
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lishers, for the purpose of competing with the reprint, brought out
an edition of their own in Edinburgh, to be sold in this country at
the same price as the reprint. The publishing house of Scribner,
Armstrong & Co., New York, was appointed the agents of the
foreign publishers for the sale of this low-priced edition, the first
volumes of which were received in New York in the month of
April 1878.
In Vol. IX. notices were published on the page next following
the title-page that certain articles in the volume were entered for
copyright, and were the property of Messrs. Little, Brown & Co.,
of Boston, who were the agents of the Blacks, for the sale of the
large quarto edition. The volume was reprinted by Stoddart &
Co., and the notices of copyright were reproduced in the reprint.
When Vol. X. was issued it contained notices of copyright as
follows:
"The following articles in this volume are copyrighted in the
United States of America, viz. :
"'Albert Gallatin.' Copyright 1879, by Henry Cabot Lodge.
"'Galveston.'
Copyright 1879, by A. & C. Black.
"'Garrison: An Outline of his Life.' Copyright 1879, by
Charles Scribner's Sons.
" ' Georgia: Its History, Condition and Resources, with Map.'
Copyright 1879, by Charles Scribner's Sons.
"The article ' Germany' (Part II., History), is entered according to Act of Parliament of Canada, in the year 1879, by Adam
and Charles Black, Edinburgh, Scotland, in the office of the
Minister of Agriculture."
The American reprint, Vol. X., was about to be issued, containing the above-mentioned articles, "Gallatin," "Galveston,"
"Garrison" and "Georgia," and these suits were brought to pre
vent its issuing in that form. Bills in equity were filed, which set
forth the facts of copyrighting, assignment and proprietorship of
the articles mentioned, and that the several works had been published in separate form in this country before publication abroad as
part of the encyclopodia, and alleged the threatened publication in
defendant's Vol. X.
In the first case, Charles Scribner alleged that he had purchased
from Samuel A. Drake, the author, a work eititled "Georgia," &c.,
that he had entered it for copyright at the office of the Librarian
of Congress on the 2d of October 1870, and published it first in.
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New York on the 11th of October, and therefore claimed copyright
in the work as it afterwards appeared with his consent in the
encyclopmdia; Scribner made a like statement in reference to
"Garrison," written by Oliver Johnson.
The second case was brought in the name of Henry Cabot
Lodge, author, and Charles Scribner, publisher of the work
It was alleged that this work was duly entered for
"Gallatin."
copyright, and was first published by Scribner in New York, on
the 11th of October 1879, and afterwards by consent of plaintiffs
it was published in the Encyclopeedia Britannica.
The third suit was brought by the proprietors of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, trading as A. & 0. Black, Edinburgh, and the
bill of complaint set out that these plaintiffs had purchased from
General Gilmore, the author, an unpublished work, entitled "Galveston," and that they, as assignees of the author, had entered
said work for copyright in the United States, and had first published said work October 11th 1879, in New York, and therefore
claimed the exclusive right to publish said work.
After filing the several bills of complaint, plaintiffs moved the
court for preliminary injunctions to restrain defendants from publishing these several articles in Vol. X. of the reprint of the
Encyclopaedia Britannica.
Defendant filed affidavits which set up : 1st. The history of the
publication of the Encyclopoedia Britannica in Edinburgh. 2d. The
publication of the American reprint. 3d. The controversy with
the Scribners and their agents, who are the agents of A. & C.
Black in this country-the rivalry between the American and
foreign publishers, and the conduct of the foreign publishers and
their agents in their attempts to corrupt defendant's agents to get
possession of his subscription lists and his business secrets by
irregular and improper means. 4th. Alleged that these suits were
not brought in good faith for the protection of any supposed rights
or property in the small works exhibited in court [the articles in
separate paper covers], but for the purpose of aiding the foreign
publishers in making inroads on defendant's subscription lists and
business. 5th. That the only persons interested as principals in
the issue were the Blacks; they had procured these works to be
wrtten as and for articles in the encyclopodia, and that everything
that was done in the premises was done for them, for their use, and
for their protection.
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Defendant denied that there could be any copyright in this
country in the encyclopiedia articles, that the encyclopedia was a
work compiled, printed, made and published by persons not citizens
of the United States or resident therein, and therefore could be
reprinted in this country in accordance with the provisions of the
Abt of Congress, and the well-settled policy of legislation in the
United States.
Thos. Hfy. Edsall, of New York, and John K. Valentine,
United States District Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, for complainants.
Jfosiah R. Sy.pher and Samuel . Perkins, for defendants.
The court, BUTLER, J., delivered the following opinion orally:
A preliminary injunction should issue whenever the complaint
is a proper subject of equitable cognisance, the plaintiff's right
involved, and the defendant's violation of it are clear, and the
case exhibits no special facts which would render the use of the
process unjust; and it should not issue under any other circumstances. Judge STORY (Equitable Jurisprudence, vol. 2, pages
290 and. 291), in substance says, the propriety in granting an
injunction rests solely in the sound discretion of the court; and
that the writ will not, therefore, be granted where it would operate
oppressively, inequitably, or contrary to the real justice of the
case. The courts decline to lay down any rule which shall limit
their discretion to grant or withhold the writ, as respects particular
cases. The exercise of the discretion is attended with no small
danger, from the summary nature of the proceeding, and the consequent liability to mistake. The writ ought, therefore, as this
author says, to be granted with extreme caution, and only in very
clear cases; otherwise, instead of being an instrument to promote
the public as well as private welfare, it will become a means of
extensive and perhaps irreparable injustice.
Judge BALDWIN, in Bonaparte v. The Camden & Amboy Bailroad Co., 1 Bald. 218, says, "There is no power the exercise of
which is more delicate, which requires greater caution, deliberation
and sound discretion, or is more dangerous in a doubtful case,
than the issuing a preliminary injunction."
It is a mistake to suppose that there is any material difference
between the principles and rules applicable to equity proceedings
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in patent-right or copyright cases, and any other cases of which
courts of equity take cognisance. Mr. Curtis, in his work on
Patent-Rights, p. 400, says, "the grounds of equitable jurisdiction
in patent cases are the prevention of irreparable mischief, the
suppression of multiplicity of suits, and the more complete discovery of facts than can be had at law." The Act of Congress has
simply applied equitable remedies to patent cases, to be administered
according to the rules and principles governing equity proceedings
elsewhere. These remedies, in all proper cases, would doubtless
have been applied without the statute. To entitle a complainant
to preliminary injunction where a patent-right is involved, the
existence of the right, and the evidence of infringement, 'must be
clear, and, as in all other instances where the writ issues, the case
must exhibit no circumstances which would make the remedy
unjust. As Mr. Curtis further says, at page 549, "Courts of
equity are loth to grant the writ unless the plaintiff's right is
very clear, and especially where an account by the defendant Will
answer all reasonable purposes." He further says, at page 560, in
substance, that the effect on the defendant's business or interests,
must also be considered; for inasmuch as the granting of the writ
depends upon the sound discretion of the court, exercised upon all
the circumstances of the case, and the object being to prevent
mischief, the writ will not be issued where very great injury would
be likely to ensue to the defendant from granting it, and little or
none to the plaintiff from withholding it. Judge CURTIS, in Forb,8h v. Bradford, 21 Mon. Law Rep. 471, says, "In acting on
applications for temporary injunctions to restrain the infringement
of letters patent, there is much latitude for discretion. The application may be granted or refused unconditionally or terms may
be imposed on either party for making or refusing the order. The
state of the litigation, the nature of the improvement (or other
thing patented), the character and extent of the infringement, and
the comparative loss which will be occasioned to the respective
parties, by allowing or denying the motion, must all be considered
in determining whether it should be allowed or refused." Drone,
in ds work on Copyrights, at page 524, says, "When the piracy is
important, and the consequent injury to the plaintiff material, an
injunction is usually granted, notwithstanding serious consequenc(s
to the defendant, unless there is, perhaps, an inequitable disprportion between the injury complained of and the remedy asked. '
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And furtner siys, in substance, that where tie objectionable matter
forms but a small part of the defendant's publication, the court
will compare the damage done thereby to the plaintiff with that
which the defendant will sustain if the injunction be granted; and
will hesitate to destroy the entire work in order to redress a slight
injury; that the court must sometimes incur the hazard of causing
some injurious consequences to one party or the other, and the aim
should be to take that course which seems to be most equitableunder all the circumstances. This author also says, at page 517,
"If the court is not reasonably satisfied that the plaintiff had a
valid copyright, or that piracy has been committed, an injunction
will not be granted." And at page 516, he says, "The question
of granting a temporary injunction is affected by many considerations. It depends chiefly on the extent of doubt as to the validity
of the copyright, whether it has been ihfringed; the damages
which the plaintiff will sustain if it is withheld, and the defendant
suffer if it is granted.
In Keene v. Wheatley & Clarke, Am. Law Reg., Judge CADwA.A ER refused the preliminary writ, although he was satisfied
of the plaintiff's right, and the defendant's infringement; because
he believed the extent of the plaintiff's injury (to be sustained
prior to the final hearing), could readily be measured, and be compensated in money, and the danger of loss to the defendant be
thus avoided.
I am not satisfied of the validity of the copyright granted to
the Messrs. Black. I do not think anybody in the cause is fully
satisfied. I think it may safely be said that the question is open
to very serious doubt. I do not propose to say more respecting it
at this time.
That of the other plaintiff, as respects the copyright itself, is
freer from doubt. There is certainly, however, room for considerable doubt about the right to use it to prevent the reprint and publication of the encyclopoedia in which he has allowed it to appear.
I entertain such doubt. It does not make any odds whether the
doubt which the court entertains upon an application such as this,
arises upon consideration of the facts presented independently of
the right upon which the claim is based, or whether it arises as a
matter of law respecting the right. The doubt in my mind as respects both of these cases, is such that, without more, I should feel
it to be my duty to deny this motion and decline the issuing of an
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injuLction until the questions thus involved are fully, carefuily and
deliberately considered and settled. Were I to issue the process in
advance of this I would incur the danger of doing serious injustice
to the defendants.
In addition to this, I believe that the injury likely 'o result to
these plaintiffs, from a denial of this motion, will be very much
less than that which would be suffered by the defendants, if it
was granted. In considering the injury likely to ensue to the
plaintiffs, it must be borne in mind that we are to look simply at
the profits or advantages likely to be obtained by the plaintiffs
from the publication and sale of these copyrighted works, independently of this encyclopoedia. They do not relate to subjects of
very great general interest. It is not probable the demand for
them would be extensive. Thus far there is no evidence before
the court of any demand. I do not remember that there is any evidence that any considerable number of either has been published
for circulation. I think, with the information the court now has, I
am justified in inferring that they were prepared for use in this
encyclopedia, and with no very serious purpose to print them
separately for circulation.
Then again I am to consider the loss likely to ensue to the plaintiffs from these defendants' work, supplying the demand for these
copyrighted works as separate publications. And only in that view
am I to consider it.
Now will this encyclopmdia at all affect that demand? Is it
probable that a single individual purchaser who desires these
articles or works as separate publications will be lost to the owners?
Is it probable that the opportunity of selling to any individual will
be lost to the owners of these copyrights-the plaintiffs-by reason
of the publication of these articles in the encyclopoedia ?
Then again, is it probable that the reprinting of these articles in
the defendants' book will increase the circulation of the encyclopodia itself to any considerable extent? It must be borne in mind
in this respect, that these plaintiffs have consented to the publication of these articles in the encyclopoedia. Now, is it probable
that the defendants' publication will increase the circulation of the
encyclopmdia at all ? In other words, if the reprint were not published and circulated, may it not be inferred, reasonably, that the
great number of those who will purchase the reprint, would have
purchased the original work? In other words, is not this contest
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between the British publisher and these defendants, a contest fox
the field for the encyclopedia, and if the defendants' work were not
printed, would not the field be covered by the foreign publisher? I
have said enough to indicate the thought already, probably, that the
defendants' publication will not increase the circulation of these
articles through the means of the, encyclopoedia at all. If it does
increase it, in my judgment it will be but to a very limited extent.
The defendants' publication is said to be cheaper. A few persons
may be induced to buy it who would not buy the other for that
cause, but the character of these publications, and the character of
the individuals who subscribe for or buy them, is such as precludes
the idea that the circumstances would make any material difference
in the circulation of the work. Looking at the subject in all its
aspects, I am inclined to think that the injury to be sustained by
the plaintiffs from the republication of these articles in the reprint
of the encyclopmdia, between this, at all events, and the final
decree in this case, must be very small indeed.
On the other hand, the injury to the defendants from the issuing of this writ at this time must be serious. There can be no
room for doubt about that, and the seriousness of it does not arise
from the importance of these articles themselves, for they do not
strike the court as being very important.
But an earnest contest has arisen between the foreign publisher
and his agents and these defendants-a contest for the field for this
work-which has led to anger, ill-will-probably to a resort to
means on the one side, and on the other, that should have been
avoided. Now if the court at this time was to interfere in such
way that the defendants could not reproduce the foreign edition
(it makes no odds that they might have added an occasional article),
but if it could be said by the publisher of a foreign edition and his
agents, that this is not a reprint, that these defendants are forbidden and prohibited from reprinting a part of the matter found in
the fbreign edition, it would, in my judgment, virtually drive the
reprint out, and leave the field to the other side, and it would be
occupied and harvested probably before this case was concluded.
The defendant is not to be looked upon simply-in the light of an
ordinary wrongdoer. This is not an ordinary case. At the time
he commenced this publication there was nothing unlawful in what
he did. To reproduce a foreign publication is not wrong. There
may be differences of opinion about the morality of republishing
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here a work that is copyrighted abroad, but the public policy of
this country as respects the subject is in lavor of such republication. It is supposed to have an influence upon the advance of
learning and intelligence. The defendant at the beginning could
not know that before this work was completed and fully issued it
would contain articles which were copyrighted. He had seen previous editions of this work published, one after another, without
any such obstacles being cast in the way of a reprint. There was
nothing, therefore, to warn him of the insertion of such matter.
Indeed he had every reason to believe that there would be nothing
of the kind. He is not to be blamed, therefore, for what he did up
to this time. Whether he is wrong now depends altogether upon
how the questions to which I have adverted are decided. But to
interfere with him at this time would, in my judgment, be almost,
if not quite, disastrous. I will not enlarge upon the subject.
There is another question involved here that I will not consider;
that which affects the bona fide8 of the application for these writs;
the question whether or not they are really intended for the protection of these copyrights, or for the purpose of giving to the
publisher of the foreign edition of this encyclopmdia an advantage
in the contest for this field. That question I will not consider. I
will say nothing about it. It is not necessary for the purposes of
this motion.
For the reasons indicated the writ is refused.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.
HENRY A. HORTON, TausTz, v. IRVING CHAMPLIN.
B. sued A., and judgment was given in favor of A. for his costs. Subsequently
A.'s attorney brought debt on this judgment against B., using the name of A.,
but without authority from A. Hl/d, that the action was not legally brought.
Held, further, that A. not being legally in court, the action must be dismissed
without costs.
Relation of attorney and client defined.
An attorney's lien on a judgment in his client's favor originates in the control
which by his retainer the attorney has over the judgment and the legal process which
enforces it. This enables him to collect the judgment and reimburse himself. It
gives him no right to exceed the authority given by the retainer. The attorneyhas,
however, to the amount of his fees and expenses, an equitable right to control the
iudgment against his client and his opponent, if in collusion with his client, which
Vol. XXIII.-56

HORTON v. CHAMPLIN.
the cowt at its discretion will protect and enforce. So the court will, if possibie,
protect the attorney in matters of equitable set-off. This is the full scope of the
attorney's lien, so called. The lien does not authioize a suit on the judgment with
out the client's consent and direction.

The present depresent
Horton,
against
suit
a
in
plaintiff
was
fendant, Champlin,
Mathewcosts.
his
for
Horton
for
given
Judgment was
plaintf_.
son, who was attorney for Horton, claiming that the costs belonged
to him, then brought this present suit, in Horton's name, for the
costs.
The court below was asked by defendant to dismiss the action
because it was brought and prosecuted without authority. This
the court refused to do, and defendant assigned the refusal for
error.
EXCEPTIONS to the Court of Common Pleas.

Rollin Matthewson, for plaintiff.
Bosworth

4. Champlin, for defendant.

DuEJE, C. J.-The attorney who prosecutes the action admits
that he was not expressly authorized to biing it, but justifies himself on the ground that he was attorney for the plaintiff in the
action in which the judgment in suit was recovered, and has a lien
on the judgment for fees and costs, and he claims, that by reason
of this, and of his former employment, he was, and is entitled to
institute and prosecute the action. Is his claim valid ? We think
not.
The authority of an attorney retained to prosecute or defend an
action, extends only to the recovery of final judgment and to its
He
enforcement by execution or other subsidiary proceedings.
judgment
the
enforce
or
revive
to
action
new
a
cannot institute
without a new,warrant or authority from his client. KYellogg v.
Gilbert, 10 Johns. Rep. 220; Walradt v. Maynard, 8 Barb. S. C.
584; Lusk v. Hastings, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 658 ; Macbeath v. Cooke,
1 Moore & Payne 513; 4 Bing. 578; Richardson v. Talbot, 2
*Bibb 382; Hfinkley v. St. Anthony Falls Co., 9 Minn. 55; -Egan
v. Rooney, 88 How. Pr. 121 ; Day v. Welles, 81 Conn. 844.
The attorney, in support of his right to sue the judgment by
virtue of his lien, cites Woods v. Ferry, 4 Gray 357 ; tratton v.
Hussey, 62 Me. 286; Currier v. Boston &.Maine Railroad,37 N.
EL 223 ; Marshallv. Meech, 51 N. Y. 140. The first two cases,
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those from Massachusetts and Maine, hold that the attorney has the
right to sue the judgment, by virtue of his lien for fees and disbursements, which in those states is given by statute, no lien at
common law having ever been recognised. The cases are therefore
not very strong authority for a state where no such statute exists.
The other two cases emphatically assert the lien, but do not expressly decide that it authorizes the attorney to sue the judgment.
The New York case, however, does hold that the attorney is to the
amount of his lien to be deemed an equitable assignee of the judgment, which is perhaps equivalent to holding that he has a right to
sue it. But in our opinion it is going too far to hold that the
attorney has the same control of the judgment as if it were assigned
to him, for if he had, his client could not settle with the adverse
party, and it has been repeatedly decided that he can settle with
him, unless they collude to cheat the attorney: Grave8v. Eade,, 5
Taunt. 429; also 1 Marsh. C. P. 113; Marr v. Smith, 4 B. &A.
466; Welsh v. Hole, 1 Doug. 238; Pinder v. Morris, 3 Caines
165. And even when the parties collude, the remedy is not in the
hands of the attorney; but the judgment being released and the
sheriff notified not to proceed, the sheriff will be liable as a trespasser if he does proceed, though he proceeds under the order of
the attorney for the costs: Barker v. St. Quintin, 12 M. & W. 441.
The proper course for the attorney in such a case is to ask the intervention of the court: Id. ; als;, Booney v. Second Ave. Bailroad
Co., 18 N. Y. 368.
The origin and extent of the lien at common law is obscure.
Baron PARKE said, in Barker v. St. Quintin, supra, " the lien
which an attorney is said to have on a judgment, which is, perhaps,
an incorrect expression, is merely a claim to the equitable interference of the court to have the judgment held as a security for the
debt." This view of the lien was approved in Hough v. -Edward.,
1 H & N. 171, Baron MARTIN adding, by way of further explication, that "the ight of the attorney is merely this, * * * that if
he gets the fruits of the judgment into his hands, the court will not
deprive him of them until his costs are paid." Accordingly, in
Holugh v. Edward., the court held that an attachment of the
judgment was paramount to the lien.
In our opinion, the two remarks of Baron PARKE and Baron
Primarily,
MARTIN, together, pretty exactly define the lien.
without doubt, the lien originates in the control which the attorney
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has by his retainer over the judgment, and the processes for its
enforcement. This enables him to collect the judgment, and reimburse himself out of the proceeds
It gives him no right, however,
to exceed the authority conferred by his retainer. But inasmuch
as the attorney has the right, or at least is induced, to rely on his
retainer to secure him in this way for his fees and disbursements,
he thereby acquires a sort of equity, to the extent of his fees and
disbursements, to control the judgment and its incidental processes,
against his client and the adverse party colluding with his client,
which the court will, in the exercise of a reasonable discretion,
protect and enforce. And on the same ground, the court will,
when it can, protect the attorney in matters of equitable set-oft
We think this is the full scope of the lien, if lien -it can be called.
It does not authorize the attorney to sue the judgment, without
the consent or direction of the client. See J7ordan v. Hunt, 3
Dowl. P. C. 666; .Francs v. Webb, 7 C. B. 731; Jones v. Bonner,
2 Exch. Rep. 229; Clark v. Snith, 6 M. & G. 1051.
The attorney contends that the judgment, being in favor of his
client, as defendant, only for his costs, belongs absolutely to the
attorney. If this be so, the right of the attorney to sue the
judgment can hardly be questioned. We are not prepared to say
that it is not so in some states by statutes. We do not find any
statute which convinces us that it is so in this state, and, prima
faeie, the judgment belongs to the party in whose favor it is
rendered. In The Perple v. Hardenbergh, 8 Johnson 335, it
was decided that a settlement of the costs by the defendant in a
suit, in whose favor they are awarded, with the plaintiff, is valid,
if made without notice from the defendant's attorney of any claim
or lien, and without any collusion to deprive the attorney of his
costs. This decision is inconsistent with the idea of absolute
ownership by the attorney. See, also, Quested v. Callis, 10 M. &
W. 19. We have no doubt that attorneys are accustomed to treat
the costs as their perquisites, and the custom is not wholly without
warrant, inasmuch as the costs do more specially represent their
disbursements and services than the debt or damages. But, so far
as we know, the custom has never been held to authorize the
attorney to sue the judgment for his own benefit, or to do more
than enforce it by the usual processes, and, having collected it,
pocket the costs without accounting for them to his client.
The judgment if sued would. be liable to statutory set-off; and
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thus the attorney, if allowed to sue it without, the consent of the
client, might involve him in an unwished-for controversy, with the
possible result of a judgment against him instead of one in his
favor: Nicoll v. .Yicoll, 16 Wend. 446; Brooks v. Hanford, 15
Abb. Pr. 342; Benjamin v. Benjamin, 17 Conn. 110.
Our conclusion is, that the attorney instituted and is prosecuting
the action without authority, and that it must therefore be dismissed;
for though the court will presume that an attorney who brings an
action has authority to bring it, until the contrary appears, yet it
will not knowingly permit him to abuse his privilege; but, when
the contrary appears, will for its own protection, as well as for the
protection of the parties, order the action dismissed: Frye v. County
ef Calhoun, 14 Ill. 132; Critchfteld v. Porter, 3 Ohio 518;
Campbell v. Bristol, 19 Wend. 101; Dobbins v. Dupree, 39 Ga.
394. Of course, however, we cannot enter any judgment against
the plaintiff for costs; for the dismissal is ordered on the ground
that the plaintiff is not legally in court.
POTTER, J., concurring.-A fee is taxed to the attorney every term.
But if he therefore can sue in the name of the party, there is no
reason why a clerk or an officer cannot do the same. And in case
of a plaintiff recovering judgment the objection to this course is
very obvious.
It is true the clerk and officer, if they have not been paid, can
sue the party; so can the attorney.
The plaintiff evidently supposes that he has a lien, not only for
the costs taxed to the attorney of the successful party, but for his
charges and for all his services, sometimes called fees, as he claims
a lien for costs in cases where a party recovers debt or damages
only and no costs.
It might possibly be for the public good if this was the law. If
a man when he began a lawsuit knew that having employed an
attorney he could not dismiss him, and that after he had gained
his case he would be obliged to have another lawsuit with his own
attorney to get his money from him, and so on again, it would tend
very much to diminish litigation, and a defendant would get out of
such a suit as quick as possible. It might also make parties more
cautious as to choosing attorneys upon whose honor they could
rely.
The client in the present case may have shown a disposition to
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defraud his attorney of his reasonable dues for his services. But
we are now only concerned with the general rule.
If any attorney should be entitled to a lien upon a judgment
for money for anything beyond his taxable costs, it would seem
that he ought to have the same lien where the recovery is for land.
See this question decided and a great number of cases quoted in
Humphrey v. Brouning, 46 I1. 476.
The lien claimed for the attorney is no part of the old common
law. See Getchell v. Clark, 5 Mass. 309; Baker v. Cook, 11
Id. 236, 238; Simmons v. Almy, 103 Id. 83.
A great deal of confusion may arise from not distinguishing between the costs taxed to the attorney and his charges for services.
In many states there are costs taxed as between attorney and client,
whereas we have none such here. And in countries or states where
such a lien is held to exist the cases generally recognise that it
extends not to counsel fees proper, but to the taxed costs only:
Ocean Insurance Co. v. Bider, 22 Pick. 210; Wright v. C'obleigh,
21 N. H. 339.
In England the so-called lien is comparatively modern, and it
seems from Comyns Dig., Attorney, B. 11; see also, B. 16, to have
been founded on an old rule of court. Pr. Reg. 2, 4, implying
that a client cannot discharge his attorney without leave of court,
evidently intended in part to protect the attorney's costs. See, also,
Bacon Abridg., Attorney, E. But its main purpose may have been
to compel the party to notify the court of a change of attorney,
that the court and opposite attorneys might always know whom to
serve papers, orders, and notices upon.
In Mitchell v. Oldfield, 4 Term Rep. 123, A. D. 1791, Lord
KENYON said the lien depended on the general jurisdiction over the
suitors. BULLER said that the court had before laid down the rule
that they would not interfere to prevent the client from settling his
own case without first paying his attorney. But in that case a rule
was made for payment of the costs.
In Wilkins v. Carmichael, 1 Doug. 101, 104, A. D. 1779, Lord
MANSFIELD said that the lien upon papers was not very ancient,,
but the court had now carried it so far as to stop the payment of
money to the client until the attorney's bill was paid. The counsel
in the case mentioned the first instance of such an order. In
Welsh v. Hole, 1 Doug. 288, Lord MANSFIELD said the attorney
had a lien on money received, for his bill of costs. If it came to
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his hands he could retain it, or he might apply to the court and
they would prevent its being paid over unul the attorney's bill was
paid. But he was inclined to go still further, and to hold that the
attorney might give notice to the defendant, &c. But he thought
they could not go beyond that. In that case the plaintiff compromised the case and the court sustained it.
These cases show that the English practice was not settled very
early. And it should be considered that the jurisdiction of the
King's Bench is almost without limit, and that they can do things
which would not be allowed in our courts.
In this country the practice has varied very much. See Story
on Agency, § 383. In most of the cases usually referred to, the
lien is either given or recognised by statute.
In New York it is recognised by statute, but only as to the costs
taxed to the attorney and not for services, and it is enough to
show how far they have carried the doctrine of the power of an
Attorney, to refer to a case, Anon., 1 Wend. 108, where the court
is represented (?)as laying it down generally that the client could
not control the attorney in the conduct of the suit. If the court
only intended to say the client could not oblige his attorney to
argue a point which he knew wjs against the settled law, which
was that case, or to say that no attorney could be compelled by his
client to do anything that would injure his professional reputation.
it was reasonable enough, and the attorney should exercise a discretion in this. Within my own experience, I have known lawyers
to make points in a case almost as a matter of desperation, and to
succeed by them. There is hardly any nonsense for which some
authority cannot be found in a large law library.
And in St. John v. Diefendorf, 12 Wend. 261, the New York
Supreme Court held, that until notice given, the officer could pay
the attorney's costs to the plaintiff without incurring any liability
to the attorney.
Platt v. Jerome, 19 How. U. S.384, was a case from the New
York Circuit Court. In the Circuit Court, Jerome had judgment
for costs only and became insolvent. The parties settled the case
and agreed that the writ of error should be dismissed. Jerome's
counsel opposed the dismissal, and claimed a lien on the judgment
for his costs. NELSON, J., says: "It is quite clear he can have
no lien for any costs in this court, as none have been recovered
against the plaintiff in error. * * * The court looks no farther
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than to see tnat the application for the dismissal is made by
the competent parties, which are usually the parties to the record.
* * * He is not a party to the suit nor does he stand in the place
of the party in interest. He is in no way responsible for the costs
of the proceedings, and to permit him to control them would, in
effect, be compelling the client to carry on the litigation at his own
expense, simply for the contingent benefit of the attorney." The
cause had been dismissed and the motion to restore it was denied.
In Ptdver v. Harris, 52 N. Y. 73, 76, the court held that the
suit was subject to the control of the party; that the attorney had
a lien after judgment, but not before. The latter would prevent
the party from settling his case; and see Simmons v. Almy, 103
Mass. 33; Averill v. Longfellow, 66 Me. 237.
In Massachusetts the lien was evidently derived from statute
originating in 1810. The provision in the Massachusetts Digest
of 1860, cap. 121, § 37, substantially, I believe, the same, provides
that an attorney lawfully possessed of an execution or who has
prosecuted a suit to final judgment for his client, shall have a lien
thereon for the amount of his fees and disbursements in the cause,
but this shall not prevent the payment of the execution or judg..
ment to the judgment-creditor without notice of the lien.
The Massachusetts courts have expressly recognised that there
was no such lien at common law: Baker v. Cook, 11 Mass. 236,
238; Getchell v. Clark, 5 Mass. 309; that it depends on the statute of 1810; Baker v. Cook, ante; .Dunklee v. Locke, 13 Mass.
525; and that, although it speaks of fees and disbursements, it
refers to taxable costs only, and does not include counsel fees;
Ocean Insurance O. v. Rider, 22 Pick. 210; and in Getchell v.
Clark, ante, the power of the plaintiff to settle before judgment, or
settle afterwards, is fully recognised.
In re Paschal,10 Wall. 483, which was a case from Texas, the
court, while recognising a lien for disbursements and professional
services, also allowed the attorney to be changed before his costs
were paid, saying that the party was amply able to respond to
whatever he might recover.
I have made these remarks upon the doctrine in general, and as
to its extent in England and in this country, because they have a
bearing on the question before us, and as showing the conflict of
decisions, and that they depend very much on local law and
usages.
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In Forsythe v. Beveridge, 52 Ill. 268, the Supreme
Court held
that there could be no lien except when statutes or
rules of court
allowed specific fees as taxable costs.
In this state costs are taxed generally only to the party
recovering and no costs are taxed as between attorney and
client. It is
the party who recovers the judgment and not the attorney.
By the
old law a fee was taxed for the attorney, evidently intending
it as
an allowance for the pay of his attorney. By the
law as lately
amended, a fee is taxed to the attorney, thus giving
countenance to
the claim that when recovered it belongs to him. If
there is any
lien, therefore, it should only be for this fee, unless he
has paid the
officers' fees or other fees. The travel and attendance
is expressly
taxed for the party, and how any attorney can have
any claim for
this, it is hard to see.
It is not to be denied that the attorney generally collects-the
debt
and whole costs, and uses it in settling with his client.
The plaintiff's attorney in this case claims the costs by
an equitable assignment. It is not contended that there was
any express
assignment. An equitable assignment is where a party
intends to
do something, to convey some right which cannot be
enforced at
law, but only in equity. There is no pretence that
there ever was
any agreement or intention to assign this bill of costs
to the plaintiff's attorney. It cannot be claimed by usage.
Usage cannot
control the express words of the statute which gives
the travel and
attendance to the party.
There having been no assignment of the judgment,
the action
cannot be sustained in the name of the party as
trustee to the
attorney.
Exceptions-sustained. Case dismissed without costs.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
HENRY HOLT v. BENJAMIN TURPIN.
Words are actionable which in effect charge one with
testifying falsely in a judicial proceeding, and it is immaterial that the person
about whom the words were
spoken was not examined as a witness, or did not testify
in the particular case, or
that there never was such a judicial investigation.

TRIS was an appeal from the judgment of the court
of Pulaski
county, sustaining.a demurrer to the petition in an action
of slander.
The facts are fully stated in the opinion.
VoL. XXVIII.-57
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
PRYOR, C. J.-The charge is: "The defendant, Benjamin Turpin, in the presence of divers persons, maliciously and falsely spoke
of and concerning the plaintiff, and his said testimony and information given before said grand jury the words, ' He swore a God
damn lie in giving his testimony before said grand jury by stating
that Hiram Heath did not ride his (Heath's) horse in James Holt's
house, for the purpose of preventing the said Heath from being
indicted by said grand jury."' A demurrer being sustained to
this petition, it was amended and the further allegation made "that
the plaintiff was never sworn or testified before the grand jury of
Pulaski county about the matter of Hiram Heath riding his horse
into James Holt's house, and that the words spoken of; and concerning the plaintiffs, were false and malicious." A demurrer was
sustained to the petition as amended and the action dismissed.
It is alleged that the plaintiff was sworn as a witness and testified
before the grand jury of Pulaski county, at its September Term
1878, in prosecutions then pending and being investigated before
said grand jury, and with reference to this testimony the alleged
slanderous words were spoken, when, in fact, the plaintiff had given
no testimony with reference to Hiram' Heath. The grand jury, as is
alleged, was properly empanneled and sworn and was authorized to
administer an oath to the witness called to testify. A charge of
false swearing is indictable when the tribunal before whom the party
testifies, or is said to have testified, is authorized to administer an
oath. "He swore false before the grand jury (says Townshend) is
actionable-you swore false at the trial of your brother John," &c.
Words are actionable which, in effect, charge one with testifying
falsely in a judicial proceeding, and the fact that the person of
whom the words were spoken was not examined as a witness, or
did not testify in the particular case, is immaterial, or if there never
was such a judicial investigation, the party speaking the slanderous
words is liable. The charge having been made, the party cannot
be relieved from responsibility on the ground that no such judicial
proceeding was had, or if had, the party charged with false swearing was not examined as a witness. Whether the charge constituted perjury or false swearing is also immaterial, as in either case
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the party, if guilty under the law of this sfate, would be subjected
to punishment: Townshend on Slander 230.
Judgment below reversed and cause remanded, with directions to
overrule the demurrer, and for further proceedings.

Supreme Court of Oregon.
THOMAS DUCKER v. THE STATE.
One who is paid by mistake money to which he is not entitled, and who upon
discovering his mistake fraudulently converts the money to his own use,
is guilty of
!arceny.
A. by mistake paid to B. a roll of twenty-dollar gold pieces, supposing it to
be a roll
of half dollars. B. subsequently discovered the mistake, and knew, or had
the means
of knowing, who was the owner, but nevertheless appropriated the money
to his own
use and refused on demand to make restitution. Held, that he was guilty
of larceny.
Where, on the trial, the court is requested to give the jury certain instructions,
and the bill of exceptions is silent on the subject, it is presumed that they
have been
given.
APPELLANT was tried and convicted upon an indictment charging
him with the larceny of ten twenty-dollar gold pieces, the property
of Theodore Bracker.
The testimony introduced at the trial, on behalf of the state,
tended to show as follows: That the defendant went into the place
of business of Bracker, in the city of Astoria, where the defendant
was well known and acquainted and where he had often been before
and on like business, and asked Theodore Bracker to change a gold
coin for him. That in giving defendant his change Bracker gave
him, by mistake, a roll of coin for a ten-dollar roll of silver, that
was a roll of ten twenty-dollar pieces, thereby giving him by mistake the sum of $190 too much. That said roll of gold twentydollar pieces was rolled up and enclosed in paper and closely
resembled a ten-dollar roll of silver. The defendant took the roll
and without unrolling or examining it placed it in his pocket and
after talking a few moments went on his way.
That Bracker, upon discovering the loss of the gold coin, recollected that he had changed money only with the defendant and
Judge Elliott, and afterwards was informed by Elliott that his
(Elliott's) change was all right; that he did not speak to defendant
about it sooner for the reason that he believed that -if defendant
was honest he would return the money, and if he was not honest he
would deny having it and get the money out of the way, and Bracker
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would lose it; that afterwards a man was in his (Bracker's) store
and was speaking about a mistake that had been made in Astoria
in changing money, and that Bracker then met the defendant and
said to him, "Didn ' t you get the better of me nearly $200 in
change some time ago ?" Defendant said, " H ow's that ?" Bracker
answered, "Why, I gave you a roll of gold coin instead of silver,
and you got at least $190 too much." Defendant answered, "Yes,
that's so, and I am sorry for it, for I have squandered the money ;
but I will give you my property." Bracker said nothing more at
the time, but soon after met the defendant and asked him to give
him his note for the amount. Defendant answered, " No, I won't
do it. You think you have got me in a corner.. I didn't get any
of your money, and I won't do anything of the kind."
The state also introduced evidence tending to show that the same
evening or the next day, or at any rate very soon after getting the
change, the defendant showed one Livingston about 4200 in twentydollar gold pieces, and told him that some one, either Parker. or
Theodore (meaning Theodore Bracker), had given him that by
mistake for silver, and that if it was Theodore he was going to give
it back to him.
The defendant introduced no testimony, but by his counsel,
moved for his discharge on the ground that there was no evidence
of a felonious taking.
The defendant, being convicted, appealed to this court.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PRIM, J.-The indictment charges the appellant with the larceny
of ten twenty-dollar gold pieces. At the trial the court, among
other things, charged the jury that "if the prosecuting witness
returned to the defendant ten twenty-dollar gold pieces under the
belief that he was giving him that number of silver pieces, and the
defendant so took them, sharing the mistake, and if upon discover.
ing the mistake the defendant knew, or had the means of knowing,
who the owner of the gold pieces was, but he therefore, nevertheless,
converted them to his own use, it was larceny."
This instruction is objected to on behalf of the appellant and
assigned as error. This objection, we think, is not well taken, as
the instruction contains a correct statement of the law upon the
-oint developed by the evidence in this case. The money in
excess of that which the appellant was entitled to receive, was
taken without the owner's consent, and that which was thus taken
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was appropriated to the appellant's use with an intent to cheat and
fraudulently to deprive the owner thereof.
These two elements being both present in this case are sufficient
to constitute the crime of larceny, for it will not do to say that the
owner parted with his money voluntarily; and therefore there
could not have been any unlawful taking. While it may be said
it was the physical act of the owner in handing that which was his
to another, yet it was lacking his intellectual and intelligent assent
to the transfer upon which the consent necessarily depended.
And so in a case "where money and property is obtained from the
owner by another, upon some false pretence for the temporary use
only, with the intent to feloniously appropriate it permanently,
.he taking thereof, though with the owner's consent, is larceny:
Wolfstein v. Joseph, 13 N. Y. 121; People v. NeA annes, 17
Id. 630; People v. Call, 1 Id. 120.
It is further claimed by counsel for appellant that the court was
asked to charge on his behalf, as follows:
1. That unless the jury believed from the evidence that defendant intended to convert the money so received by mistake, as soon
as he discovered this mistake, the subsequent conversion was not
larceny.
2. That if at any time after defendant discovered the mistake,
and before conversion, defendant honestly intended to reture the
money to Bracker (if Bracker was the person he received it of),
then any subsequent conversion would not constitute larceny.
3. That the animus furandi must have existed as soon as
defendant discovered the mistake, in order to constitute larceny.
It is claimed that these instructions were refused, and that the
court erred in so refusing. The bill of exceptions being silent
upon this matter, it must be presumed that they were given.
The bill of exceptions says the instructions first complained of,
and heretofore referred to in this opinion, among others were given
without specifying what they were.
There being no substantial error in the record, the judgment is
affirmed.

